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HUMAN FACTORS I N  A I R - C A R R I E R  OPERATIONS: 
THE HEARBACK PROBLEM 
by  
Capta in  W. P. Monan* 
INTRODUCTION 
C o n t r o l l e r :  "ABC, where a r e  you  go ing? Your ass igned a l t i t u d e  was 
ABC P i l o t :  " X Y Z  approach, we understood ou r  c l e a r a n c e  was t o  one 
one zero  thousand!" 
one thousand; we read  back one one thousand . . . . I '  
C o n t r o l l e r :  "Negat ive  ABC! Turn r i g h t  t o  ze ro  n i n e  zero  degrees 
You have and descend immedia te ly  t o  one ze ro  thousand. 
t r a f f i c  a t  one one thousand, t w e l v e  o ' c l o c k ,  
m i l e s . .  . . I i  - 
Every week d u r i n g  a 2-1/2-year p e r i o d ,  t h r e e  t o  f o u r  "Where a r e  you 
go ing? ! "  hazardous occur rence r e p o r t s  s i m i l a r  t o  t h e  above have been submi t -  
t e d  t o  t h e  A v i a t i o n  S a f e t y  Repor t i ng  System (ASRS). D e v i a t i o n s  f rom ass igned 
a1 t i tudes,  u n a u t h o r i z e d  t a x i  c r o s s i n g s  o f  a c t i v e  runways , nonadherence t o  DME 
c r o s s i n g  a l t i t u d e s ,  t u r n s  t o  i n c o r r e c t  v e c t o r  headings, and v a r i o u s  f l i g h t s  
over  t h e  wrong J e t  o r  V i c t o r  a i rways  -- i n  a l l ,  417 such e r r a n t  a c t i o n s  -- 
were a t t r i b u t e d  by  ATC c o n t r o l l e r  and airman r e p o r t e r s  t o  misunderstood,  
m i s i n t e r p r e t e d ,  m i s t r a n s m i t t e d  o r  unheard numbers i n  ATC-to-cockpi t  communi- 
c a t i o n s  exchanges. Of t h e  417 i n c i d e n t s  r e p o r t e d ,  85 r e p o r t s  were submi t ted  
by ATC c o n t r o l l e r s  and 332 by crewmembers. 
These er roneous a c t i o n s  p r e c i p i t a t e d  hundreds o f  t r a f f i c  c o n f l  i c t s ,  some 
n a r r o w l y  missed m i d a i r  c o l l i s i o n s ,  go-arounds, abo r ted  t a k e o f f s  and, as 
a f t e r m a t h s  t o  t h e  i n c i d e n t s ,  t h e  worrisome p o t e n t i a l  f o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  pun i -  
t i v e  a c t i o n .  On a more personal  , s u b j e c t i v e  l e v e l  , ai rmen e x p l a n a t i o n s  f o r  
t h e i r  communicat ions f a i l u r e s  f r e q u e n t l y  r e f l e c t e d  p a i n f u l  c h a g r i n  and keen 
embarrassment f o r  hav ing  made a v o i d a b l e  m is takes  i n  f l y i n g  t h e i r  a i r p l a n e s  o r  
i n  r u n n i n g  t h e i r  c o c k p i t s .  
P r e v i o u s l y  r e g i o n a l  d i r e c t o r  o f  f l i g h t  o p e r a t i o n s  f o r  an i n t e r n a t i o n a l  a i r -  
l i n e ,  Capta in  Plonan serves as an A v i a t i o n  S a f e t y  Research C o n s u l t a n t  t o  
B a t t e l l e ' s  ASRS O f f i c e .  
* 
The n a r r a t i v e  d e s c r i p t i o n s  o f  these occur rences  covered every  poss i  b l  e 
d e v i a t i o n  i n  c o c k p i t  h a n d l i n g  o f  r a d i o  communications. ATC c lea rance  mes- 
sages were sometimes misread,  soinetimes tuned ou t ,  sometimes guessed, a t  
t imes even a s c e r t a i n e d  by  an i n f o r m a l  consensus v o t e  i n  t h e  c o c k p i t .  T y p i c a l  
human causal  f a c t o r  c i t a t i o n s  i n c l u d e d :  " h e a r i n g  one number and say ing  back 
another . .  . ' I ,  "hea r ing  what I expected t o  hear " ,  " f o r g e t t i n g  t o  change the  
a l t i t u d e  reminder  t o  a new a l t i t u d e " ,  i n i x i n y  FL220 w i t h  FL200 o r  t h e  one one 
thousand w i t h  t h e  one ze ro  thousand d i g i t s ,  t r a n s p o s i n g  DME m i l e s  i n t o  a1 ti- 
tudes  o f  c r o s s i n g  r e s t r i c t i o n s ,  use o f  c o c k p i t  speakers, assumption t h a t  t h e  
o t h e r  p i l o t  a l s o  heard  t h e  c learance,  h a b i t  c o n d i t i o n i n g ,  and scores o f  s i m i -  
l a r  t r i p - u p s  between ea r ,  vo i ce ,  mind, and a c t i o n .  
ATC c o n t r o l l e r  r e p o r t s  o f  e r r a n t  comnun ica t ions  were l e s s  numerous, 
desc r ibed  work1 oad c o n d i t i o n s  i n  impersona l ,  f o rmu la ted  "system 
dev ia t i ons /sys tem e r r o r ' '  terms, and, o v e r a l l  , tended t o  r e f l e c t  o b j e c t i v e  
r a t h e r  than s u b j e c t i v e  v iewpo in ts  i n  the  n a r r a t i v e s .  T h e i r  ve rba l  s l i p s  i n  
t ransmiss ions  o f  i n s t r u c t i o n s  no rma l l y  passed unno t i ced  i n  the  c o n t i n u i n g  
f l o w  o f  inessages t o  inul t i p l e  a i r c r a f t .  Only by  r e v i e w i n g  t h e  ATC tape  subse- 
quen t  t o  an i n c i d e n t  c o u l d  p a r t i c i p a n t s  hear  what i n  f a c t  had been s a i d  on 
t h e  f requency,  and t o  whom. I n d i v i d u a l  human-factor  elements seldom were 
l a b e l l e d  as causa l  agents  f o r  t he  i n c i d e n t s ;  when mentioned, they  were non- 
s p e c i f i c  and genera l .  " ' T i s  human t o  e r r " ,  r e a d  such a c o n t r o l l e r ' s  comment, 
and " I  guess I proved I was human w i t h  t h i s  m is take" .  
However, more b a s i c  and perhaps more t roublesome i ssues  than  e r r a t i c  
human-performance l i m i t a t i o n s  emerged f rom a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  417- repor t  
da tase t .  The fundamental advantage o f  an i n c i d e n t - r e p o r t i n g  system, such as 
t h e  ASRS, i s  i n  i t s  c a p a b i l i t y  t o  r e v e a l  deep runn ing ,  r e p e t i t i v e ,  causa l  
p a t t e r n s  n o t  d i s c e r n i b l e  i n  i n d i v i d u a l  r e p o r t s .  Perhaps t h e  most i m p o r t a n t  
such emerging among t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h i s  s tudy  was a s t r o n g  i n d i c a -  
t i o n  t h a t  an e s s e n t i a l  redundancy -- t h e  f a i l - o p e r a t i o n a l  , double-check p r o -  
cedure e lements r e c e n t l y  termed ' 'hearback''* -- f r e q u e n t l y  i s  m i s s i n g  f rom 
c o n t r o l  1 e r - p i  1 o t - c o n t r o l  1 e r  d ia logues .  The drop  o u t  o f  t h e  hearback 
The a c t  o f  a c o n t r o l l e r ' s  a c t i v e l y  l i s t e n i n g  t o  a p i l o t ' s  readback of  an 
ATC c lea rance .  So f a r  as t h e  a u t h o r  knows, t h e  f i r s t  use o t h e  te rm i n  t h i s  
p a t t e r n  
* 
sense was i n  the  ASRS program's  month ly  b u l l e t i n  CALLBACK (If**. 
References a r e  l i s t e d  a t  t h e  end of t h e  r e p o r t .  ** 
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c o n f i r m a t i o n  s t e p  p e r f o r c e  reduces each c o m u n i c a t o r ' s  r o l e  t o  the  c l a s s i c  
'lone man show" w i  t h  i t s  we1 1 -known f o l l  ow-on consequences. 
Perhaps no o t h e r  e s s e n t i a l  a c t i v i t y  i n  a i r c r a f t  o p e r a t i o n s  i s  as v u l n e r -  
a b l e  t o  f a i l u r e  th rough human e r r o r  and performance l i m i t a t i o n s  as spoken 
communication. Decades o f  o p e r a t i o n a l  exper ience i n  a v i a t i o n  developed t h e  
readback/hearback c o n f i r m a t i o n  procedure.  When ATC messages pass unmoni tored 
and u n v e r i f i e d  th rough  t h e  communications loops ,  t h e  c o n f l  i c t  a l e r t  f r e -  
q u e n t l y  s i g n a l s  t h e  occur rence o f  a misheard,  unheard, o r  mishandled communi- 
c a t i o n .  
APPROACH 
The scope o f  t h i s  ATC communications s tudy  cove rs  a n a l y s i s  o f  ASRS 
i n c i d e n t  r e p o r t s  i n  which t h e  ''numbers" i n  ATC niessages were misheard,  misun- 
ders tood,  o r  o t h e r w i s e  mishandled.  The s tudy  i s  a companion p i e c e  t o  a p re -  
v i o u s l y  i s s u e d  ASRS a n a l y s i s  o f  c o m u n i c a t i o n s  f a i l u r e s  a s s o c i a t e d  w i t h  i n i -  
t i a l  c a l l - u p s  and s i m i l a r  a i r c r a f t  c a l l  s i g n  mix-ups; thus,  i n c i d e n t s  i n v o l v -  
i n g  such p r o b l  erns were n o t  i n c l  uded.(2) 
D u r i n g  a 29-iiionth p e r i o d ,  f rom A p r i l  1981 th rough  J u l y  1983, 763 r e p o r t s  
o f  er roneous readbacks and missed c o n t r o l  1 e r  hearbacks were submi t ted  t o  t h e  
ASRS. A f t e r  e l i m i n a t i o n  o f  mu1 t i p l e  r e p o r t s  o f  s i n g l e  occurrences and r e j e c -  
t i o n  o f  n o n p e r t i n e n t  submiss ions,  417 i n c i d e n t s  were r e t a i n e d  f o r  a n a l y s i s .  
The purpose o f  t h e  a n a l y s i s  was t o  e x p l o r e  t h e  q u e s t i o n  "What a r e  t h e  
ma jo r  i s s u e s  i n  ATC communications" and t o  p r o v i d e  an i n f o r m a t i v e  paper on 
t h e  r e s u l t s  f o r  a l l  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  a i r space  use rs :  General a v i a t i o n  p i l o t s ,  
c o r p o r a t e  j e t  crews, P a r t  135 opera to rs ,  a i r c a r r i e r  f l i g h t  crews and con- 
t r o l l e r s  i n  a l l  t ypes  o f  ATC f a c i l i t i e s .  However, t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  r e p o r t e r s  
i n  t h i s  ca tegory  o f  i n c i d e n t  was found t o  be a i r c a r r i e r  a i rmen (79  p e r c e n t ) .  
The s tudy ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  n e c e s s a r i l y  r e f l e c t s  t h e  v i e w p o i n t s  and t h e  t ypes  o f  
i n c i d e n t s  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  o f  t h i s  segment o f  a v i a t i o n .  
An i m p o r t a n t  p e r i p h e r a l  f i n d i n g  i s  no ted .  The perusa l  o f  hundreds o f  
ATC miscommunicat ion n a r r a t i v e s  p e r m i t t e d  t h e  a n a l y s t s  t o  g e t  a sense o f  t h e  
o v e r a l l  a t t i t u d e s  o f  t h e  r e p o r t e r s .  l l l h i l e  human f a c t o r  e r r o r s  were e v i d e n t  
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i n  b o t h  c o c k p i t  and ATC f a c i l i t y ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s ,  a s o l i d  f e e l i n g  o f  mutual  
c o o p e r a t i  on , o f  f r i e n d l y  he1 p f u l  ness, and o f  t o 1  e r a n t  understanding permeated 
t h e  i n c i d e n t  r e p o r t s .  There were no ''we and t h e y "  statements r e f l e c t i n g  a 
bunker ph i l osophy .  Rather,  a " w e ' r e  i n  t h i s  t o g e t h e r "  s h a r i n g  o f  r e s p o n s i -  
b i l i t y  came t h r o u g h  c l e a r l y  i n  most r e p o r t s  f rom b o t h  airmen and c o n t r o l l e r s .  
D I S C U S S I O N  
The absence o f  t h e  c o n f i r m a t i o n / m o n i t o r i n g  s t e p  m a n i f e s t e d  i t s e l f  i n  
f o u r  ways i n  the  f lawed-communicat ions sequences d e p i c t e d  i n  t h e  s tudy 
d a t a s e t .  
1. A p i l o t  misheard t h e  numbers i n  a c l e a r a n c e  message and 
r e p e a t e d  back t h e  erroneous u n i t s  f o r  c o n t r o l  1 e r  c o n f i r -  
m a t i  on. 
2. A c o n t r o l l e r  d i d  n o t  hear -- o r  d i d  n o t  l i s t e n  t o  -- t h e  
i n c o r r e c t  readback. The airman accepted l a c k  o f  response 
as s i l e n t  c o n f i r m a t i o n  t h a t  t h e  readback was c o r r e c t .  
3. A p i l o t  c o r r e c t l y  heard and acknowledged ATC i n s t r u c -  
t i o n s ,  b u t  i n t r a c o c k p i t  mismanagement o f  t h e  c l e a r a n c e  
i n f o r m a t i o n  r e s u l t e d  i n  a d e v i a t i o n .  
4. An a d d i t i o n a l  subset  o f  communication f a i  1 u r e s  c o n s i  s t e d  
o f :  
( a )  C o n t r o l l e r  s e l f - a d m i t t e d  e r r o r s  i n  i n i t i a l  
t r a n s m i s s i o n  o f  t h e  numbers. These s l i p s ,  mental  
and v e r b a l  , were n o t  caught  by t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  du r -  
i ng p i  1 o t  readback of  t h e  erroneous i n f o r m a t i o n  , 
and, 
( b )  Inadequate "Roger" o r  "okay" o r  "So l o n g "  t ypes  o f  
p i 1  o t  acknowledgements f o r  c l  earances t h a t  p re -  
c l  uded any c o n t r o l  1 e r  doubl e-check of t h e  completed 
exchange. 
The Airman ' s I n f o r m a t i  on Manual (AIM) addresses t h e  redundancy p r o b l  em 
i n  ATC/cockpi t  communications i n  l o w  key, a d v i s o r y  s t y l e  language. "AS a 
means o f  mutual  v e r i f i c a t i o n " ,  s t a t e s  t h e  procedura l  gu ide  f o r  airmen, 
" p i l o t s  o f  a i r b o r n e  a i r c r a f t  should read  back those p a r t s  o f  ATC c lea rances  
and i n s t r u c t i o n s  c o n t a i n i n g  a l t i t u d e  assignments o r  vec to rs . .  . ' I .  The read-  
back o f  t h e  numbers serves as a double-check between p i l o t s  and c o n t r o l l e r s  
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and reduces t h e  k i n d s  o f  communication e r r o r s  t h a t  occu r  when a number i s  
e i  t h e r  m i  sheard o r  i s  i ncor rec  t ( 3 ) .  
A i r c a r r i e r  f l i g h t  o p e r a t i o n s  manuals (FOMs) have n o t  o n l y  adopted t h i s  
procedure b u t  have s t i  f f ened  t h e  "shou ld "  recommendation i n t o  ''must'' r e q u i r e -  
ments f o r  t h e i r  a i rman. a i r -  
c a r r i e r  o p e r a t i o n s .  
Readbacks o f  ATC messages a r e  mandatory i n  a l l  
ATC c o n t r o l l e r  r e p o r t s  t o  the  ASRS c l e a r l y  i n d i c a t e  acceptance o f  t h e  
double-check f u n c t i o n  as a procedura l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r s  i n  
t h e  t a l  k / l  i s t e n / c o n f i r m / c o n f i r m  sequence. The c o n t r o l 1  e r l s  du ty ,  as everyone 
knows, i s  d u a l :  he must n o t  o n l y  i s s u e  a c o r r e c t  c l e a r a n c e  t o  t h e  c o r r e c t  
a i r c r a f t ,  b u t  t h e r e a f t e r ,  he must l i s t e n  t o  t h e  p i l o t ' s  readback t o  ensure 
t h a t  t h e  airman has heard t h e  message c o r r e c t l y .  Thus, he i s  r e s p o n s i b l e  
b o t h  f o r  t h e  i n i t i a t i n g  ' ' to l l  l i n k  and c o n f i r m i n g  t h e  completed s t e p .  
There i s  some i r o n y ,  perhaps, i n  t h a t  a c o n t r o l l e r ' s  ' 'system d e v i a t i o n "  i n  
communicat ions f r e q u e n t l y  c o n s i s t s  o f  n o t  c a t c h i n g  someone e l s e ' s  e r r o r .  "It 
i s  sad," n o t e d  one r e p o r t e r ,  "when a c o n t r o l l e r  must go th rough  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  
and complete r e c e r t i f i c a t i o n  -- a l l  because some p i l o t  d i d  n o t  l i s t e n  ade- 
q u a t e l y  t o  a t r a n s m i s s i o n " .  
' ' from'' 
However, w h i l e  i n d i v i d u a l  c o n t r o l  1 e r s  c l e a r l y  accepted t h e  p rocedura l  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  l i s t e n i n g  c o n f i r m a t i o n  o f  p i l o t  readbacks, i t  may be some- 
t o  
d i s c o v e r  t h a t  no c u r r e n t  w r i t t e n  r e g u l a t i o n s  r e q u i r e  t h e  c o n t r o l 1  e r s  t o  hear  
back, t h a t  i s  t o  1 i s t e n  t o  t h e i r  readback messages. The s u b j e c t  i s  absen t  
f rom t h e  ATC C o n t r o l l e r s  Handbook*; i t  appears u n l i k e l y  t h a t  t h e  o m i t t e d  p r o -  
v i s i o n  m e r e l y  "dropped th rough  t h e  c racks " .  The amp1 i f i e d  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  
" p i  1 o t s - s h o u l  d-make-readbacks" recommendation i n  t h e  A I M  p r o v i d e s  quasi  - 
o f f i c i a l  r e c o g n i t i o n  t h a t  c o n t r o l  1 e r  hearbacks a r e  n o t  a1 ways poss i  b l  e . ( 4 )  
what s t a r t l i n g  t o  airmen -- who a r e  r i g i d l y  r e q u i r e d  t o  make readbacks -- 
"There a r e  some occasions when the  c o n t r o l l e r  must i s s u e  
t i m e  c r i t i c a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  and he may 
be i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  UbAQnve yam trchnpuuzrle v i s u a l l y  o r  on 
r a d a r .  I' ( i t a l  i c s  added) 
See Addenda a t  t h e  end f o r  f u r t h e r  d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h i s  m a t t e r .  * 
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A d i r e c t  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  o f  t h i s  passage would seem t o  be t h a t  l o o k i n g  
th rough t h e  tower windows o r  scanning t h e  da ta  b l o c k  readouts  on t h e  r a d a r  
scope may be s u b s t i t u t e d ,  d u r i n g  heavy t r a f f i c  c o n d i t i o n s ,  f o r  s tandard  
l i s t e n i n g / c o n f i r m a t i o n  s tep  i n  ATC comnunicat ions.  
t h e  
The passage from A I M  appears d i r e c t l y  r e l e v a n t  t o  t h e  broken v e r b a l  com- 
mun ica t i on  sequences i d e n t i f i e d  i n  the  s tudy .  
1. Each r e p o r t e d  erroneous o r  inadequate p i l o t  readback i n  
t h i s  s tudy  d a t a s e t  comprised an occas ion  when c o n t r o l  1 e r s  
' 'heard" readbacks v i a  t h e  v i s u a l  o r  r a d a r  o b s e r v a t i o n  
s tep .  
2. Any occas ion  where in readback responses a r e  "observed" 
r a t n e r  than 1 i stened t o  i n v o l  ves a t r o u b l  esome s t i n g e r  
f o r  the  a i rmen p a r t i c i p a n t s .  I f  t h e  airman has heard  t h e  
message c o r r e c t l y ,  a l l  i s  w e l l  even though t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  
does n o t  1 i s t e n  t o  t h e  readback; t h e  a i rman 's  response 
a c t i o n  w i l l  be c o r r e c t .  I f  n o t ,  t h e  immediate o r a l  
c o r r e c t i o n  s tep  cannot  b e  taken,  and t h e  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  
" o b s e r v a t i o n "  o f  t h e  i n c o r r e c t  readback can occur  o n l y  
a f t e r  t h e  a i rman has a c t e d  upon t h e  pe rcep tua l  e r r o r .  
The p i l o t  has now commit ted an apparen t  f l i g h t  d e v i a t i o n  
and may be l i a b l e  f o r  FAA enforcement  a c t i o n .  
A w a i t i n g  c o n f i r m a t i o n  o f  p i l o t  readbacks v i a  r a d a r  obser -  
v a t i  on p l  aces a d d i t i o n a l  emphasis f o r  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  con- 
f l i c t i n g  t r a f f i c  (due t o  d e v i a t i n g  a i r c r a f t )  upon the  
c o n t r o l l e r ' s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  t a r g e t s  on h i s  scope. It 
a l s o  p laces  i nc reased  r e l i a n c e  upon t h e  c o n f l i c t  a l e r t  
d e v i  ce  . 
4. I n  t h i s  s tudy ,  Ground Cont ro l  o r  Local  C o n t r o l l e r  p a r t i -  
c i p a t i o n  i n  t h e  missed communication exchanges u t i l i z e d  
v i s u a l  through-the-window s i g h t i n g s  o f  a i r c r a f t  i n  1 i e u  
o f  l i s t e n i n g  t o  a p i l o t ' s  v e r b a l  message. The use o f  
r a d a r  f o r  obse rv ing  responses i n s t e a d  o f  l i s t e n i n g  f o r  
poss i  b l  e er roneous readbacks u s u a l l y  took  p l  ace a t  h i g h e r  
a l t i t u d e s  - -  a t  o r  above 10,000 f e e t  - -  i n  ARTCC con- 
t r o l l  ed a i r s p a c e .  
3 .  
Table 1 g i v e s  t h e  a i r s p a c e  t y p e  d i s t r i b u t i o n  i n  wh ich  t h e  i n c i d e n t s  took  
Table 2 i n d i c a t e s  t h e  t ypes  o f  hazardous i n c i d e n t s  r e s u l t i n g  f rom p l a c e  
misheard ATC/pi l o t  communications. 
and 
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TABLE 1. TYPES OF ATC AIRSPACE CONFIGURATIONS RELATED TO 
417 ATC COMMUNICATIONS FAILURE INCIDENTS 
A i r s p a c e  Types 
Center  a i r s p a c e  
TCA and m a j o r  t e r m i n a l  areas 
Small t e r m i n a l  areas 
Large tower f a c i  1 i ti es 
Small tower  o p e r a t i o n s  
T o t a l  







TABLE 2. TYPES OF HAZARDOUS INCIDENTS RESULTING 
FROM MISHEARD ATC/PILOT COMMUNICATIONS 
To t a  1 417 
D e v i a t i o n s  f rom Assigned A1 t i t u d e / F l  i g h t  L e v e l s  
D e v i a t i o n s  i n  Headings 
D e v i a t i o n s  i n  Airway Rout ings 
F a i l u r e s  t o  "Ho ld  Shor t "  o f  t h e  A c t i v e  






Erroneous Readbacks o f  Numbers: 
-. Wrhy A i r m e n i d n ' t  Get i t  S t r a i g h t  
"My f i r s t  o f f i c e r  t o l d  me t h a t  he heard and read  back t h e  
c l e a r a n c e  ' t o  c r o s s  t h e  20 DME o f  X Y Z  a t  10,000 f e e t  and 
250 K n o t s ' .  
" A f t e r  we l e v e l l e d  o f f  a t  10,000, ATC adv ised  we had been 
c l e a r e d  t o  11,000, n o t  10,000. T h i s  came as a b i g  
s u r p r i s e  t o  us.. . ' I .  
There i s  an o l d  s a y i n g  i n  a v i a t i o n  -- sometimes r e f e r r e d  t o  b y  airman 
r e p o r t e r s  t o  ASRS -- t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  two t ypes  o f  a i rmen: those  who have 
"bus ted"  an a l t i t u d e  assignment and those who have - - NOT YET done so. ' ' I  
d i d n ' t  t h i n k  i t  would ever  happen t o  me -- b u t  i t  d i d ! " ,  "I never  b e l i e v e d  I 
would f a l l  i n t o  t h e  t r a p  - -  b u t  I d i d " ,  ''1 always t h o u g h t  t h a t  i t  c o u l d n ' t  
happen t o  me -- Wrong!" Such were t h e  r u e f u l  comments f rom airmen r e p o r t e r s  
who had m is read  t h e  numbers i n  ATC c l e a r a n c e  messages and the reby  i n v o l v e d  
themselves i n  p o t e n t i a l l y  hazardous s i t u a t i o n s .  
Nor d i d  h i g h  f l i g h t  t i m e  i n  a p i l o t ' s  logbook p r o t e c t i v e l y  f e n d  o f f  
miscommunicat ions mishaps. General A v i a t i o n  p i l o t s  checked o f f  100 t o  1,500 
hours  on t h e  ASRS r e p o r t  forms. P r o f e s s i o n a l  a i rmen r e p o r t e d  i n  w i t h  a t y p i -  
c a l  10,000 hours  b u t  w i t h  i n d i v i d u a l  h i g h s  up t o  28,000 hours.  "No numbers 
o f  hours makes one irmnunel' , n o t e d  one 20,000-hours r e p o r t e r ,  " L i s t e n i n g  
c l o s e l y  i s  t h e  name o f  t h e  game. I l e a r n e d  my l e s s o n ! "  
I n  t h e  j a r g o n  o f  t h e  airman c o m u n i t y ,  " a l t i t u d e  bus t ' '  n o r m a l l y  connotes 
an u n i n t e n t i o n a l  d e v i a t i o n  from an ass igned l e v e l .  F requen t l y ,  t hese  e x c u r -  
s i o n s  a r e  c a u s a l l y  1 i n k e d  w i t h  c l  ea r  sky/unl  i m i  t e d  v i  s i  b i  1 i ty  1 apses o f  
a t t e n t i o n  t o  f l i g h t  p a t h  t r a j e c t o r y .  C o n t r o l l e r s  know i t  w e l l ;  one ATC 
r e p o r t e r  no ted :  "No airman b u s t s  h i s  a l t i t u d e  i n  I M C  c o n d i t i o n s " .  ASRS data 
suppor t  t h i s  b i t  o f  c o n t r o l l e r  l o r e .  Weather f a c t o r s  a r e  c i t e d  as b e i n g  
p r e s e n t  i n  l e s s  t h a n  20 p e r c e n t  o f  r e p o r t e d  occurrences i n v o l v i n g  a l t i t u d e  
dev i  a ti ons . 
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As opposed t o  " a l t i t u d e  b u s t s "  where t h e  crew had t h e  c o r r e c t  numbers 
b u t  f l ew  i n c o r r e c t l y  i n  a l t i t u d e  d e v i a t i o n s  due t o  misheard numbers, t h e  
f l i g h t  pa th  o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t  i s  as i n t e n d e d  by  t h e  f l i g h t  crew. A l t i t u d e  
awareness i s  n o t  l o s t .  D i s t r a c t i o n s  a r e  n o t  i n v o l v e d .  Nor a r e  weather con- 
d i t i o n s .  These miscommunication events  t o o k  p l a c e  i n  s o l i d  I M C  as w e l l  as i n  
VMC. I n  seve ra l  Occur rences ,  a i r c r a f t  descended i n  t h e  c louds  th rough  h o l d -  
i n g  s tacks .  "There were 6 a i r c r a f t  i n  t h e  h o l d i n g  p a t t e r n  and ABC descended 
th rough  5 of them on h i s  way down t o  15,000 feet...". "The p i l o t  heard  h i s  
assignment as 10,000 i n s t e a d  o f  t h e  11,000 i ssued  t o  him. When t h e  t a r g e t s  
rneryed b o t h  a i r c r a f t  were h o l d i n g  a t  10,000.. . ' I .  Hazard p o t e n t i a l  i n  these  
cases i s  o f t e n  severe.  
Misheard numbers were n o t  1 i m i  t e d  t o  a1 t i t u d e  assignments.  "Turn t o  
zero  f i v e  n i n e  degrees" was rear ranged i n  readback t o  "zero  n i n e  f ive. . . " .  
"Heading t h r e e  t h r e e  zero"  was read as a c lea rance  t o  c l i m b  t o  FL330. S i m i -  
l a r l y ,  " h o l d  s h o r t  o f . .  .'I iiiessages and o t h e r  r o u t i n e  t a x i  i n s t r u c t i o n s  became 
en tang led  f a c t o r s  i n  confused i n c u r s i o n s  i n t o  o r  across  a c t i v e  runways. 
'I.. . c l ea red  t o  t a x i  ga te  t o  9L on a r o u t e  r e q u i r i n g  
c r o s s i n y  t h e  end o f  rwy 4L. Upon c r o s s i n g  4L tower  
s t a t e d  we were t o l d  t o  h o l d  s h o r t  o f  4L. F i r s t  O f f i c e r  
and I c o u l d  n o t  r e c a l l  b e i n g  t o l d  t o  h o l d  s h o r t  and d i d  
n o t  r e a d  back any c lea rance  t o  h o l d  short . . . " .  
I n  148 of these misheard number occurrences,  t h e  event  i n  t h e  c h a i n  was 
a t r a f f i c  c o n f l i c t  where t h e  d e v i a t i n g  a i r c r a f t  came unacceptab ly  c l o s e  t o  
ano the r  a i r c r a f t  e i t h e r  on t h e  ground o r  i n  f l  i g h t .  
L i n k  f a i . l u r c s  i n  t h e  ATC/Cockpit communication c h a i n  a r e  shown i n  Table 
3 .  
O f  t h e  417 occurrences,  328 f e a t u r e d  a i rman 1 i sten ing / response d e f i c i e n -  
c i e s .  M ishear ing  t h e  numbers t o o k  p l a c e  i n  174 d e v i a t i o n s ,  n o t  h e a r i n y  
amended c l  earanccs was r e p o r t e d  i n  38, and i nadequate "Royer" "Okay", and 
s i m i l a r  s h o r t c u t s  i n  acknowledgement r e s u l t e d  i n  46 "nonadherences t o  ATC 
i n s t r u c t i o n s " .  I n  4 1  a d d i t i o n a l  c o n t r o l l e r / p i l o t  d ia logues ,  a i rmen i n s i s t e d  
t h a t  t h e y  had read t h e  numbers c o r r e c t l y :  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  had e r r e d  i n  
t ransmiss ion .  " I  may have goofed I' read a t y p i c a l  n a r r a t i v e  " b u t  I d o n ' t  
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TABLE 3. LINK FAILURES I N  THE ATC/COCKPIT COMMUNICATION C H A I N  
F a i  1 u r e  Modes 
~~ 
ATC message numer ics t r a n s m i t t e d  c o r r e c t l y  b u t  heard  
i n c o r r e c t l y ,  and hearback f a i  1 ed. 
0 Misheard  ATC c l e a r a n c e / i n s t r u c t i o n  numer ics 
(The 10,000/11,000 mix  - 28) 
(The FL200/FL220 mix  - 11) 
(Other  combina t ions  - 135) 
0 Inadequate acknowledgements ( "Roger", ''So Long", 
"Okay") w i t h  subsequent f l  i g h t  d e v i a t i o n s  
0 Apparent  i n a t t e n t i o n  t o  amendments t o  ATC 
c 1 earanc es/ i n s t r u c  ti on s 
0 Cockpi t m i  smanayemen t r e s u l  t i n g  i n  readback 
e r r o r s :  complacency, f a t i g u e ,  nontask 
d i s t r a c t i o n s ,  h a b i t  c o n d i t i o n i n g ,  schedule 
p ressure ,  use o f  speakers, minor  system 
mal f u n c t i o n s ,  e t c .  
ATC message numer ics t r a n s m i t t e d ,  heard,  and r e a d  back 
c o r r e c t l y  b u t  f o l l owed  by d e v i a t i o n s  due t o  c o c k p i t  
m i  smanageinent. 
0 Misuse o f  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r  d i s p l a y  
0 Other  -- p r i m a r i l y  " f o r g e t t i n g "  
Acknowledged c o n t r o l  1 e r  hearback f a i l u r e s  
0 F a i l u r e  t o  hear  e r r o r  i n  p i l o t  readback 
0 Source o f  numeric e r r o r  unknown ( e i t h e r  i n  
t r a n s m i s s i o n  o r  r e c e i v i n g  -- i n s u f f i c i e n t  
d e t a i l  i n  r e p o r t ) ,  b u t  n o t  heard  i n  readback 
0 C1 earance amendment n o t  acknowledged by p i  1 o t  
and n o t  c h a l l  enged by c o n t r o l  1 e r  
Number o f  














t h i n k  so".  F i n a l  l y  7 1  t r a n s m i s s i o n  e r r o r s  were a t t r i b u t e d  t o  i n t r a c o c k p i t  
mismanagement o f  t h e  c lea rance  i n f o r m a t i  on. 
Human f a c t o r s  comprised t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  airman e x p l a n a t i o n s  f o r  m i s s i n g  
t h e  numbers i n  ATC messages. There was a c o n s i d e r a b l e  v a r i e t y  repo r ted .  "It 
i s  easy f o r  a f l i g h t  crew t o  misunderstand an ATC c learance ' '  e x p l a i n e d  one 
airman, an o p i n i o n  suppor ted by 173 o t h e r  r e p o r t e r s  who n a r r a t e d  t h e  how and 
t h e  why o f  t h e i r  p a r t i  c u l  a r  t ransg ress ion .  
" I n  my exper ience,  f l i g h t  crews a re  prone t o  i n t e r p r e t  an 
a d v i s o r y  o f  t r a f f i c  a t  some a l t i t u d e  as c lea rance  t o  t h a t  
a1 t i t ude . 'I 
* * * *  
" I f  f l i g h t  crews p l a n  o r  reques t  a s p e c i f i c  a l t i t u d e ,  
t h e y  t e n d  t o  t r a n s l a t e  t h e  n e x t  c lea rance  i n t o  t h a t  a l t i -  
t ude ! "  
The human f a c t o r  inadequacies l i s t e d  by  t h e  a i rmen were f a m i l i a r  and 
r e p e t i t i v e .  P i l o t s  heard  what t h e y  expected t o  hear ,  heard  what t h e y  wanted 
t o  hear  and f r e q u e n t l y  d i d  n o t  hear  what t h e y  d i d  n o t  a n t i c i p a t e  h e a r i n g  -- 
amendments t o  j u s t - i s s u e d  c learances .  There were s c a t t e r e d  admi t tances  o f  
h u r r y i n g  because o f  schedule p ressure .  There was l a x i t y :  "It was such a 
b e a u t i f u l  day" and " i t was a d u l l ,  r o u t i n e  f l i g h t . . . " .  "We were a l i t t l e  
t i  r e d "  e x p l a i n e d  seve ra l  a i  m e n .  Other  r e p o r t s  o f f e r e d  o n l y  nonpl ussed "I 
d o n ' t  know why" nonexp lanat ions .  There were c o n s i s t e n t  s l i p s  a p p a r e n t l y  
caused b y  s i m i l a r  sounds of  severa l  number combina t ions  - 5 and 9, 7 and 17, 
5 and 1 5 .  f o r  example. The "one one ze ro "  and t h e  "one zero zero"  thousand 
and t h e  FL200/220 mixups were r e p o r t e d  i n  40 i n c i d e n t s .  
One e r r o r  p a t t e r n  c o u l d  be c l e a r l y  i d e n t i f i e d :  m ishear ing  o f  t h e  
numbers occu r red  most f r e q u e n t l y  when s ing1 e, one sentence c l  carance messages 
c a l l e d  f o r  two o r  more separa te  p i l o t  a c t i o n s .  Thus, " c ross  XYZ a t  one one 
thousand,  descend and m a i n t a i n  one zero  thousand, reduce speed t o  250 
knots..." o r  "C leared t o  descend t o  FL two two zero,  c r o s s  t h e  twen ty  DME o f  
ABC a t  FL two ze ro  zero.. . 'I. 
A1 though f requent  use o f  "we" phraseo logy  ("We l e v e l  l e d  o f f . .  .'I, "We 
descended...or c l imbed . . . I 1 )  u n i f i e d  f l i g h t  crew a c t i o n s  d u r i n g  m u l t i p l e  crew 
o p e r a t i o n s ,  many n a r r a t i v e s  i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  o n l y  one airman was communicating 
and 1 i s t e n i n g  t o  ATC c l e a r a n c e s / i n s t r u c t i o n s .  The b a s i c  r o l e s  o f  " p i l o t  f l y -  
i n g "  and " p i ' l o t  h a n d l i n g  t h e  r a d i o s "  s p l i t  t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  i n  p r i m a r y  t a s k  
accomplishments - -  a v a r i a b l e  s h i f t  depending upon ''whose l e g  i t  was t o  f l y " .  
There were many phases o f  t a x i i n g  and a i r b o r n e  f l i g h t  where in t h e  ATC cornmun- 
i c a t i o n s  t a s k s  were accomplished w i t h o u t  t h e  crosscheck m o n i t o r i n g  o f  t h e  
p i l o t  f l y i n g .  Th is  loss o f  redundancy was p a r t i c u l a r l y  no ted  i n  r e p o r t s  f rom 
two-man c o c k p i t  crews. "There a re  many t imes"  s t a t e d  one such r e p o r t e r ,  
"when o n l y  one p i l o t  i s  on ATC. The o t h e r  p i l o t  i s  busy elsewhere...". 
Th is  accepted "one-man c o c k p i t  show" i n  ATC comnuni c a t i o n s  was comnon- 
p l a c e  i n  c e r t a i n  phases o f  a i r c a r r i e r  o p e r a t i o n s :  i n  t h e  engine s t a r t u p ,  
t a x i i n g  o u t  a c t i v i t i e s ,  d u r i n g  any minor  m a l f u n c t i o n  i n  e a r l y  c l i i nbou t  - -  
i n c l u d i n g  manual p r e s s u r i z a t i o n ,  systems f u n c t i o n i n g ,  PA announcement i n t e r -  
v a l s ,  p r e p a r a t i o n s  f o r  approach, t u n i n g  r a d i o s ,  e tc . ,  e t c .  One airman no ted  
t h a t  he was " o f f  ATC" due t o  h i s  p r e p a r a t i o n  f o r  t h e  s t e r i l e  c o c k p i t  phase a t  
10,000 f e e t .  These t y p e s  o f  i n c i d e n t s  appeared t o  demonstrate an i n h e r e n t  
l i m i t a t i o n  i n  t h e  crew concept  p r i n c i p l e  o f  each p i l o t  c ross rnon i to r i ng  t h e  
o t h e r .  Redundancy i n  ATC m o n i t o r i n g  was p r o v i d e d  b u t  o n l y  on a " b e s t -  
e f f o r t " ,  " t i m e - a v a i l a b l e "  b a s i s .  The s i n g l e  General A v i a t i o n  o r  m i l i t a r y  
p i l o t  served n e c e s s a r i l y  as bo th  f l y i n g  p i l o t  and ATC communicator. 
" I  f i n i s h e d  t h e  c r u i s e  b r i e f i n g  t o  t h e  pax. I asked t h e  
F i r s t  O f f i c e r ,  'What 's  up? '  'C lea red  down t o  8,000', he 
s a i d ,  I We' r e  descendi ny . . . I I '  
* * * *  
"I depended upon the  F/O t o  hand le  ATC w h i l e  I gave t h e  
numbers t o  t h e  company. I n  t h a t  respec t ,  i t  was my 
f a u l  t . I '  
The o v e r r i d i n g  in ipor tancc o f  c o n t r o l  1 e r  hearbacks was obv ious:  v i r t u -  
a H y  a l l  t h e  airmen r e p o r t s  man i fes ted  a t r u s t i n g  dependence upon t h e  con- 
t r o l l e r  assurance f u n c t i o n .  c o n t r o l l -  
e r s  always l i s t e n e d  t o  them. Such was t h e  unvary ing ,  undoubt ing " l e a p  of 
J u s t  as p i l o t s  -. always made readbacks, 
12 
f a i t h "  i n  p i l o t  submiss ions th roughout  t h e  s tudy.  " I  r e a d  back, t h e y  d i d n ' t  
say a n y t h i n g  so I descended...". "No c h a l l e n g e  f ro in  c o n t r o l l e r ,  so we 
climbed...", "No adverse word f rom c o n t r o l l e r ,  so..." e t c . ,  e t c .  
T h i s  stamp o f  a c o n t r o l l e r ' s  approval  - a l b e i t  a s i l e n t  one --  c l e a r l y  
was accepted as t h e  e s s e n t i a l  redundancy s t e p  d u r i n g  ATC d ia logues .  Th is  
"b lank  check" r e l i a n c e  upon t h e  hearback l i n k  appeared as a s u r p r i s i n g  depar-  
t u r e  f r o m  t h e  a i r m a n ' s  normal ph i l osophy  o f  h e a l t h y  s u s p i c i o n  about  p l a c i n g  
t r u s t  i n  o t h e r  people,  p a r t i c u l a r l y  persons o u t s i d e  t h e  c o c k p i t .  I n  some 
ins tances ,  p i l o t  dependency upon a c o n t r o l l e r ' s  l i s t e n i n g  r o l e  emerged as 
near  n a i v e t e  i n  accep t ing  supposed c lea rances  t o  be low known t e r r a i n  a l t i -  
t udes : 
"We took  t h e  c lea rance  t o  'descend t o  7,000', made a 
readback and s t a r t e d  down. However, we had t o  l e v e l  o f f  
a t  11,000 t o  c l e a r  t h e  mountains.  The Capta in  then ques- 
t i o n e d  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  who s a i d  12,000, n o t  7,000 had been 
ass igned . I '  
* * * *  
"I accepted an a l t i t u d e  below t h e  MSA. I t  was my casua l  
assumption, b e i n g  on r a d a r  vec to rs ,  t h a t  I was b e i n g  
g i v e n  l a t e r a l  s e p a r a t i o n  f rom t h e  t e r r a i n .  L u c k i l y .  
t h e r e  was a break  i n  t h e  clouds...". 
* * * *  
" I F R  a t  2,500 f e e t ,  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  t o l d  me, 'You a r e  i n  
an MVA o f  3,600 f e e t '  and ' c l i m b  immediately..." '. 
The same dependence upon readback/hearback channels was e x h i b i t e d  i n  t h e  
scores  o f  a i rmen r e p o r t s  o f  m is read aniendnients t o  p r e v i o u s  i n s t r u c t i o n s .  
" I f  ATC changes an a l t i t u d e ,  t h e y  shou ld  be sure t o  g e t  
an acknowledgement froin t h e  crew and n o t  assume t h a t  t h e  
p i l o t s  heard  t h e  new r e s t r i c t i o n . "  
* * * *  
"Center  c a l l e d  and asked i f  we had r e c e i v e d  an a l t i t u d e  
r e s t r i c t i o n . . .  We s a i d  ' N o , '  n o r  had we made an 
acknowledgement. Th is  i s  an o l d  problem w i t h  ATC...". 
* * * *  
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''...to p reven t  t h i s  happening, ATC shou ld  r e q u i r e  a l l  
runway c r o s s i n g  o r  h o l d  c lea rances  t o  be read back." 
Airmen d isparaged t h e i r  own performance most b i t t e r l y  when t h e y  had 
f l o w n  t h e  wrong a i rways  r o u t i n g s .  The " c l e a r e d  as f i l e d "  s h o r t c u t s  sometimes 
b a c k f i r e d :  "I d i d  n o t  check t h e  c lea rance  i ssued  t o  us and compare i t  w i t h  
o u r  f i l e d  f l i g h t  p lan  r o u t i n g .  A dumb m is take ! "  I n  another  wrong d i r e c t i o n  
f l i g h t ,  t h e  f l i g h t  crew read  back t h e  ' 'hard copy" o f  t h e i r  f l i g h t  p l a n  r a t h e r  
t h a n  t h e  r e v i s e d  r o u t i n g  j u s t  i ssued  t o  them b y  c lea rance  d e l i v e r y .  Twenty- 
f i v e  m i l e s  on t h e i r  way, t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  asked, "Where a re  you go ing?"  "Stu- 
p i d ! "  w ro te  t h e  airman, " J u s t  p l a i n  s t u p i d i t y  on my p a r t ! "  
Yet t h i s  se l f -b lam ing  a i rman and hundreds of  o t h e r  p i l o t s  ended t h e i r  
r e p o r t s  t o  ASKS w i t h  a s i n y l e ,  r e p e t i t i v e  query:  "So, I made an e r r o r .  But  
I made a readback. Why d i d n ' t  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  c a t c h  t h e  e r r o r  i n  my read-  
back?"  
Th is  h i g n  l e v e l  o f  dependency upon c o n t r o l l e r  i n t e r c e p t i o n  o f  e r r o r  
expressed b y  a l l  a i rmen - -  General A v i a t i o n ,  c o r p o r a t e ,  a i r  t a x i  and a i r c a r -  
r i e r  --  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  a i rmen r e p o r t s  i n  t h e  s tudy.  It 
developed i n t o  t h e  one dominant theine i n  t h e  s tudy ,  a query expressed e i t h e r  
i n  puzzlement,  i n  c h a g r i n  o r  i n  dismay: "Soooo, we made a m is take .  BUT we 
made a readback. WHY d i d n ' t  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  c a t c h  o u r  e r r o r  i n  t h e  readback?"  
The Missed Hearback Prob l  em: 
"Why ATC D i d  Not Cor rec t  o u r  Readback i s  Unknown..." 
The a i  rman I s r o  1 e i n  t h e  t a l  k / l  i s t c n / c o n f  i rm/con f i  r m  communi c a t  i ons 
exchanges w i t h  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  emerged f rom t h e  r e p o r t  d a t a  as a c l e a r l y  
d e f i n e d ,  s tep-by-s tep  sequence - -  a s e t  o f  r i g i d ,  "must-do" procedures.  
F i r s t  i n  emphasis was adherence t o  t h e  readback requ i rement .  "We made a 
readback...", "We made a f u l l  readback...", "We c a r e f u l l y  made a read-  
back...", " I n  accordance w i t h  Company p o l i c y ,  we r e a d  back t h e  f u l l  c l e a r -  
ance...". "We read  back t h e  c lea rance  s l o w l y  t o  make sure...", e tc . ,  e t c .  
Tt i rouyhout hundreds of n a r r a t i v e s  t h e  a i  rinen ca re fu l  l y  and r e p e t i t i v e l y  
s t ressed  accoinpl i shment o f  t h e i r  "by- the-book"  readback tasks .  
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Next was t h e  l i s t e n i n g  mode: h e a r i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  ve rba l  con f i rma-  
t i o n  o r  a t  l e a s t  s i l e n t  acquiescence o f  t h e i r  readbacks. Th is  double-check 
l i n k  was t h e  e s s e n t i a l  d e t a i l  i n  t h e  d ia logues .  Perhaps c o n d i t i o n e d  by  c rew 
concept  p r i n c i p l e s ,  t h e  a i rmen tended t o  downgrade t h e  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  t h e i r  
own l i s t e n i n g  e r r o r s  as less c r i t i c a l  than t h e  m o n i t o r i n g  r o l e  o f  t h e  con- 
t r o l  1 e r .  
"Whi le  i t  i s  p o s s i b l e  t h a t  we misunders tood t h e  con- 
t r o l l e r ,  n e v e r t h e l e s s  we were r e l y i n c i  upon t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  - - .  
t o  c o r r e c t  any m is takes  i n  t h e  readback." 
f u n c t i o n ,  I n e v i t a b l y ,  
r e s o r t e d  t o  exc 
tern" . 
w i t h  such t r u s t  i n  t h e  hearback 
amat ion p o i n t s  i n  r e g i s t e r i n g  a 
a i rmen f r e  qu en t 1 y 
arm a t  f a  l u r e s  i n  t h e  "sys-  
" I f  t h e  readback i s  ignored,  then redundancy b u i l t  i n t o  
t h e  system t o  c o r r e c t  e r r o r s  i s  use less ! "  
* * * *  
" I  must emphasize t h a t  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  must a c t  as a 
c o r r e c t i n g  sa feguard  when we read  back a c learance! ' '  
* * * *  
"My impress ion  i s  t h a t  c o n t r o l l e r s  a r e  n o t  i n  a l i s t e n i n g  
mode. As soon as t h e y  i s s u e  a c lea rance ,  t h e y  s t a r t  
t a l k i n g  t o  o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  and pay no a t t e n t i o n  t o  t h e  
readbacks . ' I  
* * * *  
"It i s  my o p i n i o n  t h a t  I c o u l d  read back my s o c i a l  secu- 
r i t y  number and most c o n t r o l l e r s  would n o t  q u e s t i o n  i t !  
Centers  a r e  worse than  te r r t i ina l  f a c i l i t i e s  i n  t h i s  
m a t t  e r . 
The c o m p l a i n t  l i s t  was l o n g  and emphat ic :  "Two o f ten ,  c o n t r o l l e r s  
a r e n ' t  1 i s t e n i n g ! "  "I can o n l y  say, readbacks a r e  impor tan t ! "  "Readback 
c o n f i r m a t i o n  b y  c o n t r o l l e r s  i s  a doub t fu l  mat te r . "  And, f i n a l l y  t h e  r e p e t i -  
t i v e  e x h o r t a t i o n ,  " C o n t r o l l e r s  shou ld  1 i s t e n  t o  readbacks!"  
However, n e i t h e r  a c o n s i s t e n t  theme n o r  concern w i t h  t h e  v a r i o u s  human- 
f a c t o r  c i rcumstances  r e l a t e d  t o  hearback d e f i c i e n c i e s  c o u l d  be d i s c e r n e d  i n  
c o n t r o l  l e r  n a r r a t i v e s .  C o n t r o l l e r  submiss ions tended t o  focus  upon c o n f l i c t  
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i n t e r v e n t i o n  a c t i o n s  w h i l e  t h e  p r i o r  causa l  readback/hearback d e f i c i e n c i e s  
were de-emphasized. It appeared frorn t h e  n a r r a t i v e  t rea tmen t  o f  t h e  
i n c i d e n t s  t h a t  c o n t r o l l e r s  f r e q u e n t l y  remained unaware t h a t  t h e y  had n o t  
heard  an erroneous o r  not-made readback u n t i l  t h e  tapes  were r u n  i n  p o s t i n -  
c i d e n t  i n v e s t i g a t i o n s .  T h i r t y - f o u r  of t h e  85 c o n t r o l l e r  r e p o r t s  e i t h e r  o m i t -  
t e d  a l l  r e f e r e n c e s  t o  p i l o t  readbacks o r  condensed t h e  s u b j e c t  i n t o  o n e - l i n e  
b r e v i t i e s :  "I d i d  n o t  rea l i ze . . . " ,  " I  f a i l e d  t o  hear...", " I  d i d  n o t  
catch...", " I  d i d  n o t  copy...", " I  missed hearing...", " I  d i d  n o t  l is ten. . . " ,  
"I d i d  n o t  recogn ize .  . . ' I ,  e tc . ,  e t c .  Twelve a d d i t i o n a l  r e p o r t s  i n d i c a t e d  
t h a t  c o n t r o l l e r s  had n o t  n o t i c e d  t h a t  no p i l o t  readback had been made t o  an 
amended a l t i t u d e / h e a d i n g  message. 
O v e r a l l ,  r a d a r  o b s e r v a t i o n  and c o l l i s i o n  avoidance a c t i o n  were t h 2  sub- 
j e c t s  o f  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  submissions. Fur thermore,  c o n t r a r y  t o  p i l o t  n a r r a -  
t i v e s  t h a t  desc r ibed  t h e  human f a c t o r  c i rcumstances  t h a t  had d i m i n i s h e d  t h e i r  
a t t e n t i v e n e s s  t o  ATC t ransmiss ions ,  c o n t r o l l e r  r e p o r t s  tended t o  fo rma t  t h e  
miscommunicat ions events  i n t o  s tandard i zed  "System Devi a t i o n "  and/or "System 
E r r o r "  phraseology.  Th is  a t t i t u d e  p robab ly  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  h i g h e r  p r i o r i t i e s  
of j o b  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y :  s e p a r a t i o n  o f  conve rg ing  t r a f f i c  was o f  paramount 
impor tance no m a t t e r  what t h e  causes m igh t  be. 
T a b u l a t i o n  o f  t h e  85 c o n t r o l l e r  submi t ted  r e p o r t s  conf i rmed t h e  con- 
t r o l l e r s '  o v e r r i d i n g  concerns w i t h  c o l l i s i o n  avoidance. Seventy o f  t h e  
nonweather r e l a t e d  i n c i d e n t s  i n v o l v e d  t r a f f i c  c o n f l i c t s  t h a t  had developed 
f r o m  t h e  ATC/p i l o t  communications breakdowns, t h e  m a j o r i t y  o f  c o n t r o l l e r s  had 
c o n f i n e d  s i g n i f i c a n c e  o f  co rmun ica t i ons  t o  "Loss  of Standard Separa t ion"  o r  
t h e  more hazardous near  m i d a i r  c o l l  i s i o n  occurrences.  
These d i f f e r i n g  p r i o r i t i e s  s t r o n g l y  a f f e c t e d  t h e  r e p o r t e r s '  assessments 
o f  t h e  ser iousness  o r  g r a v i t y  o f  communications e r r o r s .  Somewhat t o  t h e  
s u r p r i s e  (and apparent  r e l i e f )  o f  p i l o t  r e p o r t e r s ,  an a i r m a n ' s  d e v i a t i o n  f rom 
an ass igned a l t i t u d e  o r  heading f a c t o r  f r e q u e n t l y  e l i c i t e d  a r e l a x e d  "no 
problem" response from t h e  c o n t r o l l e r .  S i m i l a r l y ,  a t  t i m e s  when p i l o t s  p r o -  
t e s t e d  t h a t  t h e y  had c o r r e c t l y  read  back t h e  numbers, t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  adv ised,  
"You p robab ly  d id . . . "  o r ,  " I  d o n ' t  remember what you read b a c k " .  o r ,  "The 
c o n t r o l l e r  s a i d  he d i d  n o t  know what I had read  back" o r ,  inore f r e q u e n t l y ,  
"No comment made by t h e  c o n t r o l l e r " .  I n  t h e  eyes o f  many c o n t r o l l e r s ,  
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d e v i a t i o n s  i n  f l i g h t  pa th  due t o  miscommunicat ions had n e g l i g i b l e  impact  upon 
t h e  system u n t i l  t h e y  " rang  t h e  b e l l "  i n  a t r a f f i c  c o n f l i c t  occurrence.  
Not a l l  "no problem" t ypes  o f  i n c i d e n t s  were r e l a x e d  a f f a i r s .  The add 
phrase --  "Then t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  said..." - -  connoted an a lmost  p e r c e p t i b l e  on 
' ' gu lp"  i n  v a r i o u s  airman r e c o u n t i n y s  o f  an a l t i t u d e  assignment mixup. 
" I  asked t h e  F/O about  o u r  descent  c learance.  He sa id ,  
'Down t o  2,000 f e e t '  and s e t  t h e  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r  t o  
2,000. 
" A f t e r  we l e v e l l e d  o f f  a t  2,000, approach c a l l e d  t o  con- 
f i r m  we were l e v e l  a t  5,000. We t o l d  them we were a t  
2,000. 
"The c o n t r o l l e r  then s a i d  'You a re  pas t  y o u r  t r a f f i c .  
M a i n t a i n  2,000' . ' I  
* * * *  
"'What a r e  you d o i n g  a t  8,000!' s a i d  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r .  
'Make an imrnediate r i g h t  t u r n  t o  zero  e i g h t  zero 
degrees... ' .  Then he sa id ,  'D i s regard .  You a re  by t h e  
t r a f f i c .  ' I '  
* * * *  
"I asked i f  he wanted us t o  descend down and he sa id ,  
'No, y o u ' r e  a l r e a d y  pas t  y o u r  t r a f f i c . . . ' . "  
* * * *  
"We s a i d  ' A f f i r m a t i v e ,  w e ' r e  l e v e l  a t  FL270.' The con- 
t r o . l l e r  then s a i d  t h a t  t r a f f i c  had been a t  FL270 b u t  now 
we were pas t  o u r  t r a f f i c  and c o u l d  s t a y  a t  FL270." 
I n  p a r a l l e l  w i t h  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r s '  emphasis - -  n o t  on c o n f i r n i a t i o n  o f  
where t h e  p i l o t s  i n tended  t o  yo b u t  upon where t h e y  a c t u a l l y  went - -  con- 
t r o l l e r  s e l f - a d m i t t e d  d e f i c i e n c i e s  i n v o l v e d  i n a t t e n t i o n  - -  n o t  t o  t h e  cotnmun- 
i c a t i o n s  b u t  t o  t h e  r a d a r  d i s p l a y  o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t ' s  Mode C da ta  b l o c k .  
" A  pan icked c o n t r o l l e r  c a l l e d  US, 'AUC, c o n f i r m  FL240!'  
"The F/O rep1 i e d  'Nega t i ve .  We a r c  descending th rough  
FL232.' The c o n t r o l l e r  s a i d  'You a r e  supposed t o  be a t  
FL240. There i s  a wide body a t  230.' 
"On t h e  phone l a t e r ,  t h e  c o n t r o l  l e r  s a i d  t h a t  tie had 
d i v e r t e d  h i s  a t t e n t i o n  t o  another  f l i g h t  u n t i l  t h e  con- 
f l i c t  a l e r t  g o t  h im back t o  l o o k i n g  a t  our a i r c r a f t . "  
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* * * *  
" T r a f f i c  c o n d i t i o n s  were moderate t o  heavy --  about 16 
a i r c r a f t .  By t h e  t i m e  I g o t  back t o  ABC, he was a l r e a d y  
o u t  o f  FL334 c l i m b i n g  w i t h  XYZ 4 m i l e s  away ...I' 
* * * *  
"There were 2 1  IFR a i r c r a f t  w i t h i n  t h e  s e c t o r  o r  on hand- 
o f f  s ta tus . . . a l l  d e v i a t i n g  due t o  weather. I nadver -  
t e n t l y ,  I gave an a i r c a r r i e r  t h e  same a l t i t u d e  as h i s  
t r a f f i c .  Then I t u r n e d  my a t t e n t i o n  t o  o t h e r  t r a f f i c  
s i t  u a t  i ons. 
"The c o n f l i c t  a l e r t  a c t i v a t e d  b u t  I d is regarded  i t  
because I t hough t  I had a l t i t u d e  s e p a r a t i o n  ..." 
* * * *  
"The m i l i t a r y  t o o k  t h e  heading f o r  an a l t i t u d e  and I d i d  
n o t  c a t c h  h i s  readback u n t i l  he l e f t  h i s  a l t i t u d e . . . ' '  
* * * *  
"The erroneous readback was missed and due t o  o t h e r  
t r a f f i c  on t h e  scope (about  10 o t h e r  a i r c r a f t )  h i s  p o s i -  
t i o n  was n o t  moni tored.  The c o n f l i c t  a l e r t  ac t i va ted . . . "  
The c o n f l i c t  a l e r t  system -- t h e  s o u n d i n y / f l a s h i n g  e l e c t r o n i c  backup f o r  
c o n t r o l l e r  o b s e r v a t i o n s  f o r  t r a f f i c  s e p a r a t i o n  l o s t  o r  a b o u t - t o - b e - l o s t  - -  a t  
t i m e s  was negated by human f a c t o r  c i rcumstances.  
" C o n f l i c t  a l e r t  observed. Immediate t u r n s  g i v e n  b u t  no 
acknowl edyements f ro in  e i t h e r  a i  r c r a f t  . Targets  merged 
w i t h  no s e p a r a t i o n  and Mode C showing 5000 f e e t  f o r  b o t h  
a i  r c r a f t  .'I 
* * * *  
" C o n f l i c t  a l e r t  ac t i va ted . . .  
ABC's d a t a  b l o c k  a t  FL230 t o  react. . . "  
I was t o o  stunned a t  seeing 
* * * *  
"We a p p a r e n t l y  misunderstood 5000 f o r  6000. A f t e r  we 
s i g h t e d  an a i r c r a f t  a t  t h e  same a l t i t u d e ,  we asked t h e  
c o n t r o l l e r ,  ' D i d n ' t  he hear o u r  readback? '  Then I asked 
about t h e  c o n f l  i c t  a l e r t .  
"The c o n t r o l l e r  s a i d  i t  had alarmed b u t  t h e y  g e t  a l o t  o f  
them when a i r c r a f t  a r e  s tacked up i n  a h o l d i n g  p a t t e r n . "  
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* * * *  
" . . . a i r c r a f t  crossed i n  IMC. No t i m e  t o  i n te rvene . "  
* * * *  
"The c o n f l i c t  a l e r t  a c t i v a t e d  b u t  i t  d i d  n o t  sound i n  
t i m e  f o r  o u r  s e c t o r  t o  rcso. lve t h e  c o n f l i c t . "  
Only  13 o f  t h e  85 c o n t r o l l e r  submiss ions re fe renced  work load d i s t r a c -  
t i o n s  from a t t e n t i v e n e s s  t o  p i l o t  readbacks o r  t o  r a d a r  d i s p l a y s .  These f r e -  
q u e n t l y  were g e n e r a l i z e d  background comment, r a t h e r  than d i r e c t  s ta tements o f  
cause and e f f e c t .  Never the less  t h e  d i s r u p t i v e  i n f l  uence o f  "moderate t o  
heavy t r a f f i c "  and f requency congest ion  were o f t e n  ment ioned i n  t h e  n a r r a -  
t i v e s .  "There were 6 o r  7 a i r c r a f t  on t h e  frequency...", " I  was work ing  
about  10 a i r c r a f t  a t  t h e  t ime.. . ' I ,  " I  was work ing  15 a i r c r a f t  spread o u t  ove r  
5 f requencies. . . " ,  "Ten o t h e r  a i r c r a f t  on the scope...", " I  was m o n i t o r i n g  6 
VHR and 4 UHF frequencies...",  "Too many computer i n p u t s  t o  make...", " I  was 
v e r y  busy. . . ' I ,  e t c .  Th is  c o n s i s t e n t  f l a v o r i n g  s t r o n g l y  suggests t h a t  i n  
f a c t  work load d i s t r a c t i o n s  were t h e  p r imary  cause f o r  t h e  r a d a r  t a r g e t  
m i  sses. 
S i m i l a r l y ,  o n l y  35 o f  332 p i l o t  r e p o r t e r s  conf i rmed t r a f f i c / f r e q u e n c y  
conges t ion  as p o s s i b l e  c o n t r i b u t i n g  causal  f a c t o r s  i n  t h e  communications 
misses. "The c o n t r o l l e r  s a i d  he was ve ry  busy...", " T h i s  c o n t r o l l e r  was 
overloaded.. .'I, "Communications were ve ry  f a s t .  . . ' I ,  " I  g o t  t h e  ve ry  d e f i n i t e  
impress ion  t h a t  t h i s  c o n t r o l  1 e r  was overloaded.. .'I, "The r a p i d  pace o f  
i n s t r u c t i o n s  must have made i t  imposs ib le  f o r  h im t o  v e r i f y  my readback...", 
"The c o n t r o l l e r  d i d n ' t  seem t o  have t i m e  t o  n o n i t o r  my readbacks...", e t c .  
Frequency conges t ion  , r a p i d  pace o f  t ransmiss ions ,  f a s t  communications, and 
" t o o  busy t o  l i s t e n " ,  such were a i r m a n ' s  o b s e r v a t i o n s  o f  c o n t r o l l e r  work load 
e n v i  ronment. 
There were i n d i c a t i o n s  i n  t h e  13 c o n t r o l l e r  and 35 p i l o t  obse rva t i ons ,  
t h a t  somewhere i n  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r ' s  genera l  f l u x  o f  t ransmiss ions  t o  m u l t i p l e  
a i r c r a f t ,  i n  t h e  ove r laps  o f  i n te rphone  c a l l s  w i t h  a i r c r a f t  responses, and i n  
t h e  menta l  f l  i c k - f l i c k  o f  p l a n n i n y / a t t e n t i o n  t o  success ive  t a r g e t s ,  a p i l o t ' s  
er roneous readback may have passed unno t i ced .  
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Whether o r  n o t  these t a s k  ove r laps  f i t t h e  AIM'S a l l o w a b l e  e x c e p t i o n  t o  
normal ATC/p i lo t  v o i c e  procedures c o u l d  n o t  be determined f rom c o n t r o l l e r  
n a r r a t i v e s .  Never the less ,  t hese  se ts  o f  r e p o r t s  p r o v i d e  a l i m i t e d  response 
t o  t h e  a i rmens '  ques t i ons  about why readbacks seem t o  have been ignored.  
A d d i t i o n a l l y ,  i t  i s  o n l y  th rough  a c o n t r o l l e r ' s  apparent  "busyness" and/or  
f requency  conges t ion  t h a t  air inen may assess c o n t r o l l e r  workload. Other  f a c -  
t o r s  a re  n o t  so obv ious.  f r o m  
a d j o i n i n g  s e c t o r s :  "Can ABC have FL350?" "Can XYZ go d i r e c t  t o  - ? "  "GGG . 
f r e -  wants i n e r t i a l  d i r e c t  LAX t o  DEN." Every  message "Change o v e r  t o  
quency" mandates, as a minimum, t h a t  a c o n t r o l l e r  makes a hando f f  computer 
e n t r y  on t h e  conso le  keyboard. Fur thermore,  i n d i v i d u a l  airmen may pre-empt a 
c o n t r o l l e r ' s  t i m e  and a t t e n t i o n  e x c e s s i v e l y :  one airman may n o t  acknowledge, 
r e q u i r i n g  a repea t  t ransmiss ion .  An a i r c a r r i e r  p i l o t  may r e q u i r e  a "say 
again ' '  f o r  a f requency change. A c o r p o r a t e  j e t  p i l o t  may want t o  n e g o t i a t e  
h i s  descent  p o i n t :  he d o e s n ' t  want t o  descend "now" b u t  " a t  p i l o t ' s  d i s c r e -  
t i o n " .  S a t e l l i t e  a i r p o r t  depar tu res  may o v e r l a p  t ransmiss ions  check ing  i n  on 
t h e  f requency  f rom w i d e l y  separa ted  o u t l y i n g  l o c a t i o n s .  One c o n t r o l l e r  
a s t u t e l y  c h a r a c t e r i z e d  t h e  s i t u a t i o n ,  say ing :  "My work load i s  n o t  equated 
n e c e s s a r i l y  w i t h  t h e  numbers o f  a i r c r a f t  I ' m  hand1 i n y .  I t ' s  how much t a l  k i n g  
I have t o  do w i t h  t h e  p i l o t s  who a r e  on t h e  f requency."  
P i l o t  reques ts  f r e q u e n t l y  must be i n te rphoned  
- 
A c o r o l l a r y  f i n d i n g  f rom t h e  s tudy  was t h a t  many airmen opera te  w i t h  t h e  
assumpt ion t h a t  a r a d a r  c o n t r o l l e r  i s  c o n t i n u o u s l y  m o n i t o r i n g  t h e i r  p a r t i c u -  
l a r  a i r c r a f t  i n  i t s  p rogress  th rough  t h e  sec to r .  The airmen expressed 
puzzlement , even suspected "game p l a y i n g ' '  a t  "be ing  pcrmi t t e d "  t o  
f l y  7 o r  8 m i l e s  i n  t h e  wrong d i r e c t i o n  o r  t o  reach  1000, 2000, o r  more f e e t  
i n  d e v i a t i o n  f r o m  an ass igned a l t i t u d e  b e f o r e  be ing  cha l lenged by a con- 
t r o l  1 e r  . 
sometimes 
"Why d i d  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  w a i t  u n t i l  we were l e v e l  a t  
f e e t  b e f o r e  lie t o l d  us t o  c l i m b  back t o  6000?" 
5000 
* * * *  
" I  am puzz led.  A l though we were under r a d a r  s u r v e i l -  
l ance ,  n o t h i n y  was s a i d  t o  us as we passed th rough 
FL240. 'I 
* * * *  
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"Why d i d  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  t a k e  so l o n g  t o  n o t i c e  t h a t  we 
were a t  t h e  wrong a l t i t u d e ? "  
A l though c o n t r o l l e r  r e p o r t s  o n l y  i n f r e q u e n t l y  ment ioned work load,  i t  may 
w e l l  be t h a t  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  was busy w i t h  o t h e r  t r a f f i c  o r  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s .  
D e f e c t i  ve Cockp i t  Management: 
Why P i l o t s  F a i l e d  t o  "Keep i t  S t r a i g h t "  
A s i n g l e ,  s imp le  p i l o t - t o - p i l o t  phrase, " I t ' s  y o u r  leg...", d e f i n e s  and 
s e t s  i n t o  mo t ion  coinplex crew c o o r d i n a t i o n  f u n c t i o n s  i n  m u l t i p l e - c r e w  opera-  
t i o n  o f  an a i r c a r r i e r  a i r c r a f t .  The t r a d i t i o n a l  swap o f  l e g s  between t h e  
l e f t  and r i y h t  sea ts  s p l i t s  t h e  p r i o r i t i e s  o f  d u t i e s ,  r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s ,  
t asks ,  and a t t e n t i v e n e s s  i n t o  two c a t e g o r i e s :  " p i l o t  f l y i n g "  and " p i  l o t  coin- 
mun ica t i ng " .  The two p i l o t  r o l e s  a re  separa te  and d i s t i n c t  y e t  b o t h  mesh 
i n t o  achievement o f  a s i n g l e  g o a l :  t h e  maintenance o f  t h e  c o r r e c t  f l i g h t  
pa th  o f  t h e  a i r c r a f t .  The p i l o t  f l y i n g  works t h e  c o n t r o l s  manua l ly  o r  v i a  
t h e  a u t o p i l o t ,  b u t  i n  c o n t r o l l e d  a i r s p a c e  t h e  p i l o t  communicating must chan- 
n e l  t o  t h e  p i l o t  f l y i n g  t h e  sa fe  and/or  d e s i r e d  f l i g h t - t r a c k  i n f o r m a t i o n  as 
p lanned and i ssued  by  t h e  ATC c o n t r o l l e r s  i n  t h e  f o r m  o f  c learances .  
Crew concept  p r i n c i p l e s  o v e r l i e  these  separa te  b u t  c o o r d i n a t e d  func -  
t i o n s .  Cross c o c k p i t  m o n i t o r i n g  and a d v i s o r y  c a l l o u t s  p r o v i d e  a semi- 
con t inuous ,  " f a i l  o p e r a t i o n a l "  i n t e r c e p t i o n  o f  human e r r o r s ,  s l i p s  o r  l i m i t a -  
t i o n s .  One o f  t h e  i n s i d i o u s  t r a p s  i n h e r e n t  i n  communication e r r o r s  as 
r e p o r t e d  i n  t h i s  s tudy  was t h e  f l i g h t  c r e w ' s  m is taken  b e l i e f  t h a t  t h e y  were 
d o i n g  what ATC had i n s t r u c t e d  them t o  do. Thus, because t h e  e n t i r e  crew was 
o p e r a t i n g  under  a fa1  se assumption, t h e  i n t e r n a l  double-check p r o t e c t i o n  was 
rendered use less .  
I n  a few occurrences,  d e f e c t i v e  c o c k p i t  management p e r m i t t e d  o v e r r i d e  o f  
t h e  p r i m a r y  r u l e  i n  f l y i n g  a i r p l a n e s :  one p i l o t  f l i e s  t h e  a i r p l a n e  a t  a l l  
t imes.  
"We were p u t t i n g  i n  t h e  I N S  c o o r d i n a t e s  when t h e  c l e a r -  
ance t o  FL330 was rece ived .  We f a i l e d  t o  arm t h e  new 
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a l t i t u d e  i n t o  t h e  a u t o p i l o t .  I t hough t  t h e  F / O  had armed 
i t  and he tnought  I had. 
"C l imb ing  o u t  o f  F L 3 3 7 ,  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  cal led. . . "  
* * x *  
"The F / O  d i d  n o t  hear  t h e  amended r o u t i n g  s i n c e  he was i n  
t h e  l a v  a t  t h e  t ime.  I was d i s c u s s i n g  a pax concern w i t h  
a f l i g h t  a t t e n d a n t  - -  I d i d  n o t  w r i t e  down t h e  c lea rance  
o r  p u l l  o u t  t h e  c h a r t s .  I f o r g o t  a l l  about  i t  u n t i l  t h e  
con t r o  1 1 e r  c a 1 1 ed . . . 'I 
* * * *  
" I  was b o t h  f l y i n g  and communicating. The Capta in  was 
convers ing  w i t h  a stewardess. I though t  I heard ' c l e a r e d  
t o  10' b u t  on reach ing  10,000, t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  asked why 
we were n o t  m a i n t a i n i n g  11,000.. . 
"We must do more double-check ing i n  t h e  c o c k p i t ! "  
I n c i d e n t s  o f  f a i l u r e  o f  t h e  p i l o t  communicating t o  pass a long  and/or  t o  
c o n f i r m  mutual  unders tand ing  o f  t he  ATC numbers i n v a r i a b l y  were i n t r o d u c e d  by  
t h e  a l l  - too- farn i  1 i a r  " I  assumed t h a t . .  . I '  phraseology.  " I  assumed t h e  Capta in  
heard  t h e  c learance. .  . ' I ,  " I  assumed t h a t  he had heard my readback.. .'I, "I 
assumed t h a t  he had heard  another  c lea rance  t h a t  I missed...", "The i n s t r u c -  
t i o n s  seemed c l e a r  enough n o t  t o  war ran t  a s k i n g  f o r  a response f rom t h e  Cap- 
t a i n  who was a l s o  on t h e  f requency" ,  "The F/O d i d  n o t  t e l l  t h e  Capta in  o f  t h e  
ATC c learance. . . " ,  "The Capta in  d i d  n o t  near  and t h e  F / O  d i d  n o t  i n f o r i r i  
him.. .I(, e t c .  
A scant  l e v e l  below t h e  " I  assumed" b e h a v i o r a l  a t t i t u d e s  were t h e  "Why 
b o t h e r "  d i  s p l  ays o f  compl acency . 
"It was a d u l l  r o u t i n e  f l i g h t .  I was n o t  pay ing  any 
a t t e n t i o n  t o  what t h e  Capta in  was d o i n g  ..." 
* * * *  
"It was an easy f l i g h t .  Too easy ..." 
* * * *  
"The Capta in  was n o t  a l e r t  and was n o t  double-check ing 
me. . . I' 
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* * * *  
"The F/O had missed so  many ATC c a l l s  t h a t  I asked h im 
about h i s  o u t s i d e  a c t i v i t i e s . . . "  
I n  seve ra l  i n c i d e n t s ,  crew c o o r d i n a t i o n ,  and c o c k p i t  management appeared 
absent:  
One 
" I  was t h e  c o p i l o t  and i t  was my l e g  t o  f l y .  We had 
requested 10,000 f e e t  b u t  ATC i ssued  us what sounded l i k e  
something else. . .  I b e l i e v e d  I heard 15,000 b u t  t h e  Cap- 
t a i n  read  back 14,000. 
" I  d i d  n o t  debate t h e  c o r r e c t n e s s  o f  t h e  a l t i t u d e  s i n c e  
i t  was such a s h o r t  l e g .  I though t  we would be a s k i n g  
f o r  l ower  b e f o r e  we reached 14T. 
"About 2 m inu tes  a f t e r  we had l e v e l l e d  o f f  a t  14,000, t h e  
c o n t r o l l e r  c a l l e d .  He sounded v e r y  upse t  ... we were sup- 
posed t o  be a t  10,000 and had c l imbed  up i n t o  someone 
e . l s e ' s  a i rspace."  
p u z z l i n g  f l a w  i n  c o c k p i t  management o f  ATC messages was t h e  apparent  
r e l u c t a n c e  o f  a i rmen t o  r e c o n f i r m  d o u b t f u l  numbers w i t h  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r .  I n  
these  i n c i d e n t s ,  t h e  crew d i scussed  ariiong themselves what t h e  o t h e r  " though t  
t h e y  heard" .  "The crew discussed...",  "We a l l  agreed that.. .",  "We b o t h  
agreed ..." The f i n a l  consensus p o l l  dec ided  t h e  f l i g h t  pa th  t r a j e c t o r y  o f  
t h e  a i r c r a f t .  Dependency upon t h e  c o n t r o l  1 e r ' s  s i l e n c e  t o  t h e  readbacks 
appeared as a d e c i s i v e  i n f l u e n c e  upon t h e  d e c i s i o n  making. 
"I r e a d  back the  c learance.  No adverse word f r o m  con- 
t r o l l e r .  So we agreed t h a t  we had been cleared.. . "  
* * * *  
"We t a l k e d  among ou rse l ves  t h a t  i t  seemed t o o  e a r l y  t o  be 
g i v e n  a descent  down t o  6000 fee t . . .  However, s i n c e  t h e  
c o n t r o l  1 e r  had n o t  c o n t r a d i c t e d  o u r  readback, we des- 
cended.. I' 
The v a r y i n g  personal  a t t i t u d e s  and t h e  d i f f e r i n g  t y p e s  o f  p e r s o n a l i t i e s  
t h a t  p i l o t  s c h e d u l i n g  p r a c t i c e s  may b r i n g  t o g e t h e r  i n  t h e  c o c k p i t  seem t o  
have caused some o f  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n  s h a r i n g  f a i l u r e s  observed i n  t h e  s t u d i e s .  
I n  some i n s t a n c e s .  an a u t o c r a t i c  p i lo t - in-command a t t i t u d e  prevented e f f e c -  
t i v e  ve rba l  c o o r d i n a t i o n .  
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"It i s  n o t  always easy f o r  a F/O t o  o f f e r  suggest ions t o  
t h e  Capta in  o r  dare t o  q u e s t i o n  something he has said..." 
* * * *  
"The Capta in was s o  sure o f  h i m s e l f  t h a t  i t  would have 
been presumptuous f o r  me t o  ask h im t o  v e r i f y  t h e  i n f o r -  
mat ion.  The n e x t  t i m e ,  I w i l l  f i n d  a way t o  do i t  
r e g a r d l e s s  o f  a C a p t a i n ' s  a t t i t u d e . . . "  
* * * *  
"Lesson lea rned !  J u s t  because h e ' s  a Capta in ,  t h e r e  i s  
no need t o  assume t h a t  he opera tes  a t  a h i g h e r  l e v e l  o f  
e f f i c i e n c y  than  I do!"  
Whi le  command a u t h o r i t y  was o f ten  c i t e d  -- "The Capta in was so sure,  I 
l e t  i t  r ide. . . " ,  "I had doubts b u t  t h e  Capta in  seemed so sure...",  e t c . ,  many 
i n c i d e n t s  r e f l e c t e d  t h e  reve rse .  "The F i r s t  O f f i c e r  was so p o s i t i v e  t h a t  i t  
was FL290 . . . I 1 ,  "I should have ques t i oned  i t  b u t  he s a i d  he was sure...", 
"There was some doubt  i n  my rnind b u t  he was d e f i n i t e  about it...". One 
C a p t a i n ' s  phrase was r e p e t i t i v e :  " R e l y i n g  upon an exper ienced F/O induced 
t h i s  i n c i d e n t . "  
"The F/O had a background o f  m i l i t a r y  f i g h t e r  a i r c r a f t  
and i s  used t o  b e i n g  h i s  own commander and t a k i n g  t h e  
i n i t i a t i v e .  I was h e s i t a n t  t o  g i v e  him ha rd  o r d e r s  so I 
l e t  h im  make seve ra l  moves b e f o r e  I was ready f o r  them. 
L a t e r ,  I had a l o n y  c o n v e r s a t i o n  w i t h  h im  as t o  who was 
t h e  Cap ta in  .'I 
I n  7 1  i n c i d e n t s ,  a f l i g h t  crew c o r r e c t l y  heard a c o n t r o l l e r ' s  t r a n s m i s -  
s i o n ,  c o r r e c t l y  r e a d  back t h e  numbers, and then  proceeded t o  go elsewhere - -  
descend or c l i m b  t o  a wrong a l t i t u d e ,  head o f f  i n  ti wrong d i r e c t i o n ,  t u r n  
i n t o  a wrong a i r w a y  o r  a t  t imes ,  c r o s s  ove r  an a c t i v e  runway. The most f r e -  
quent t y p e  o f  crew c o o r d i n a t i o n  breakdown c o n s i s t e d  o f  46 misuses of t h e  
a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r  dev i ce .  
These misuses went beyond mere l y  a l l o w i n g  t h e  s i l e n t  a1 t i t u d e - s e l e c t i o n  
window d i s p l a y  t o  be s u b s t i t u t e d  f o r  t h e  t r a d i t i o n a l  spoken a l t i t u d e  
c a l l o u t .  There were i n d i c a t i o n s  t h a t  once s e t ,  i n c o r r e c t l y  i n  these  
occurrences,  t h e  a l t i t u d e  d i s p l a y  became t h e  s o l e  a u t h o r i t y  f o r  what t h e  
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a i r c r a f t  I s a1 t i  t u d e  shou ld  
t u r e d  t h e  s e l e c t e d  l e v e  
consc iousness o r  awareness 
and aga in ,  a l t hough  b o t h  a 
a m i s s e t  a l t i t u d e  s e l e c t o r  
f l  i g h t  l e v e l  . 
be. It n o t  o n l y  a u t o m a t i c a l l y  f l e w  t o  and cap- 
o f f  a l t i t u d e  i t s  use appeared t o  b l o t  o u t  p i l o t  
o f  t h e  numbers as heard  f r o m  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r .  Time 
rmen "knew" t h e  c o r r e c t  a l t i t u d e  ass igned t o  them, 
was a l l owed  t o  t a k e  t h e  a i r c r a f t  t o  an er roneous 
The l a r g e  p r o p o r t i o n  o f  those i n c i d e n t s  i n  t h e  da tase t  i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h e  
b l a c k  box once cons ide red  a c r u t c h  t o  j o g  a p i l o t ' s  memory, has, t h rough  
r e p e t i t i v e  use, l e d  t o  airmen dependency upon t h e  e l e c t r o n i c  memory. ' '1 have 
t o  be more d i l i g e n t  i n  c a r e f u l l y  s e t t i n g  t h e  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r " ,  one a i rman 
r e l a t e d ,  ' ' s i nce  I have l e a r n e d  t o  depend upon it." Another :  "Even though 
b o t h  o f  us were comp le te l y  aware o f  t h e  s p e c i f i c  a l t i t u d e  ass igned t o  us, we 
con t inued  p a s t  it...". F l i g h t  crew members' i n d i v i d u a l  r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  f o r  
m a i n t a i n i n g  a l t i t u d e  awareness appeared t o  have been t r a n s f e r r e d  t o  an e x t e r -  
n a l  memory dev i ce .  
Many a l t i t u d e - a l e r t e r  i n c i d e n t s  appeared t o  m a n i f e s t  a c r i s s - c r o s s i n g  of 
t h e  p i l o t  f l y i n g  and p i l o t  communicating r o l e s .  J u s t  as a n o n - f l y i n g - p i l o t ' s  
a r b i t r a r i l y  t a k i n g  ove r  c o n t r o l  would d i s r u p t  c o n t i n u i t y  i n  t h e  management o f  
t h e  a i r c r a f t ' s  f l i g h t  pa th ,  t h e  innocent -appear ing ,  seemingly  i nconsequen t ia l  
r e v e r s a l  of work t a s k s  t h a t  t o o k  p lace  when t h e  p i l o t - f l y i n g  s e t  t h e  a l t i t u d e  
a l e r t  d i s p l a y  confused and d i s r u p t e d  t h e  normal exchange/conf i rmat ion  t r e a t -  
ment o f  ATC messages. 
"The F/O acknowledged f o r  t h e  '310. . . I  I r e s e t  t h e  a l t i -  
t u d e  a l e r t c r  t o  FL310 and l e f t  FL350. As we went th rough  
FL345, t h e  F/O s a i d  'Tha t  was head ing  310!' A t  t h a t  
moment, a c o n t r o l l e r  i n  a concerned v o i c e  asked f o r  o u r  
a1 t i tude.  
" I n  r e t r o s p e c t ,  my a c t i o n  was s t u p i d .  The F/O knew it 
was a heading. If I had l e f t  t h e  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r  s e t -  
t i n g  t o  him, i t  would n o t  have happened." 
Two a i rmen announced firm i n t e n t i o n s  t o  " k i c k  t h e  h a b i t "  o f  dependency 
upon t h e  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r .  " I ' I I I  go ing  back t o  w r i t i n g  down a l t i t u d e  ass ign -  
ments - -  a p r a c t i c e  I gave u p  when we g o t  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r s  i n  o u r  a i r c r a f t . "  
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And, " A l t i t u d e  d e v i a t i o n s  a re  becoming epidemic.  From now on, I am go ing  t o  
w r i t e  down a l t i t udes . . . "  
The 46 i n c i d e n t  s e t  i n c l u d e d  t h r e e  b a s i c  k i n d s  o f  e r r o r s :  
1 )  A l e r t e r  m i s s e t  by  one a i rman an e r r o r  n o t  n o t i c e d  b y  
"We were c l e a r e d  t o  7000 a f t e r  c r o s s i n g  XYZ VOR a t  
11,000. The Capta in  s e t  t h e  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r  t o  
7000 and t h e  F/O who was f l y i n g  descended imrnedi- 
a t e l y  t o  7000 b e f o r e  overhead ing  t h e  VOK..." 
o t h e r  a i  rman. 
* * * *  
"We were t o l d  t o  t u r n  t o  230 degrees and descend t o  
3200 f e e t .  F / O  s e t  t h e  a l t i t u d e  window and armed 
t h e  f l i g h t  guidance system t o  2300 f e e t .  As we 
l e v e l l e d  a t  2300 f e e t ,  c o n t r o l l e r  t o l d  us t o  c l i m b  
immedia te ly  and t o  tu rn . .  . I '  
2 )  D i s p l a y  s e l e c t o r  reniained on an a l t i t u d e  s e t  d u r i n g  pre-  
"The a l t i t u d e  s e l e c t  has been s e t  t o  11,000 d u r i n g  
t h e  descent  p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  p reced ing  f l i g h t  and we 
f a i l e d  t o  r e s e t  i t  f o r  o u r  depar tu re . "  
v i o u s  a r r i v a l .  
3)  N e i t h e r  p i l o t  s e t  d i s p l a y  t o  newly  ass igned a l t i t u d e .  
"We f a i l e d  t o  c rank  i n  FL310 i n t o  t h e  a l t i t u d e  rem- 
i n d e r .  I hate  t o  admi t  i t ,  b u t  we were th rough  
FL328 when t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  ca l led . . . "  
* * * *  
"The F/O heard  t h e  4000 f o o t  r e s t r i c t i o n ,  t h e  Cap- 
t a i n  ' r o y e r e d '  f o r  i t  b u t  no one s e t  t h e  a l t i t u d e  
a1 c r t e r  . ' I  
A d d i t i o n a l  i n c i d e n t s  d i s p l a y e d  t h e  hazards i n  t r y i n g  t o  a n t i c i p a t e  an 
a l t i t u d e  assignincnt n o t  y e t  rece ived.  " I n  a n t i c i p a t i o n  o f  t h e  usua l  S I D ,  t h e  
F/O s e t  17,000 i n t o  t h e  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r .  Then he read  back o u r  c lea rance  t o  
16,000. However, he d i d  n o t  r e s e t  t h e  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r . "  Another i n c i d e n t  
was s e l  f -assessed as over fami  1 i a r i t y  w i t h  t h e  r o u t e .  "On c l  inibout, t h e  F/O 
had s e t  t h e  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r  t o  FL230. When t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  asked me t o  ve r -  
i f y  a l t i t u d e ,  I responded 'Leve l  a t  230' .  It was then  my stomach d i d  a 
nosedive.  I looked a t  t h e  c lea rance  I had w r i t t e n  down. I t was FL210." 
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And, f i n a l l y ,  t h e  m i s s e t  a l t i t u d e  a l e r t  n a r r a t i v e s  o f t e n  cu lm ina ted  i n  
v a r i o u s  lame embarrassed admi t tances :  " I  d o n ' t  know how t h e  a l t i t u d e  
a l e r t e r  g o t  s e t  t o  - thousand f e e t " ,  "How t h e  a l t i t u d e  s e l e c t o r  g o t  s e t  t o  
- f e e t  i s  unknown" , etc . ,  e t c .  
The c o n d i t i o n e d  dependence upon t h e  b l a c k  box d i s p l a y  was f u r t h e r  demon- 
s t r a t e d  by  a group o f  r e p o r t e r s  who p laced blame f o r  t h e i r  a l t i t u d e  d e v i a -  
t i o n s  on t h e  p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  dev i ce  i n  t h e  c o c k p i t  r a t h e r  than  on t h e i r  use 
o f  t h e  dev i ce .  I t  was d i f f i c u l t  t o  r e a d  f r o m  one seat  o r  t h e  o t h e r ,  d i f f i -  
c u l t  t o  s e t  f r o m  one seat  o r  t h e  o t h e r ,  d i f f i c u l t  t o  m o n i t o r  f rom one seat  o r  
t h e  o t h e r ,  i t  was a nonstandard system e t c .  Blame was a l l o c a t e d  t o  t h e  
i n s t r u m e n t  o r  i t s  l o c a t i o n  r a t h e r  than misuse. One p i l o t  recornnended i n s t a l -  
l a t i o n  o f  2 a l t i t u d e  a l e r t e r s  i n  t h e  c o c k p i t ,  one f o r  t h e  Capta in  and one f o r  
t h e  F i r s t  O f f i c e r .  
However, t h e r e  appeared t o  be a s t i r r i n g  o f  wisdom i n  many n a r r a t i v e s  o f  
missed communications, an i nc rease  i n  persona l  g rowth  f ro in  t h e i r  exper iences .  
"I had a fee l i ng . . . " ,  "It d i d n ' t  seem q u i t e  r i gh t . . . " ,  "An uncomfor tab le  
fee l ing. . . " ,  "I had an i n s t i n c t . . . " ,  " I n  t h e  back o f  my mind, I knew...", 
"For  some reason, r o l l i n g  around i n  my head...", a l l  comments t h a t  l e d  t o  
f i r m ,  emphat ic  d e t e r m i n a t i o n s :  "Anytime a crewman has an uneasy f e e l i n g  t h a t  
a l l  i s  n o t  r i g h t ,  he should check i t  o u t ! " ,  and, ''1 b e l i e v e  an i nc reased  
emphasis shou ld  be p laced on verba l  d i s c u s s i o n s  o r  b r i e f i n g s  between crew 
members so b o t h  p i l o t s  w i l l  be kep t  i n  t h e  e v a l u a t i o n  loop".  
Perhaps t h e  most s p e c i f i c  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  t h e  p i l o t  f l y i n g  and p i l o t  com- 
m u n i c a t i n g  r o l e s  as separa te  b u t  c o o r d i n a t e d  a c t i v i t i e s  was t h e  f o l l o w i n g  
d e c l a r a t i o n :  
"From now on, i n  my c o c k p i t ,  t h e r e  a lways w i l l  be a f o r -  
mal handover o f  t h e  ATC watch - -  much i n  t h e  way we hand 
o v e r  c o n t r o l  of who i s  f l y i n g  t h e  a i r p l a n e . "  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The genes is  o f  t h i s  conununications s tudy  was t h e  f r e q u e n t  and c o n t i n u i n g  
r e p o r t i n g  o f  ATC rnessaye c o n f i r m a t i o n  f a i l u r e s  t o  t h e  A v i a t i o n  S a f e t y  Repor t -  
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i n g  System. Since making readbacks i s  a deep ly  i n g r a i n e d  p r a c t i c e  i n  p i l o t -  
c o n t r o l l e r  message exchanyes - -  a "must-do" c o c k p i t  t a s k  i n  a i r c a r r i e r  opera- 
t i o n s  --  c o n t r o l l e r  apparent  f a i l u r e s  t o  "1 i s t e n - u p "  represented ,  i n  t h e  
f l i g h t  c r e w ' s  m i n d s .  t roublesome breakdowns i n  t h e  double-check procedures -- 
f a i l u r e s  i n  t h e  system t h a t  e f f e c t i v e l y  des t royed  t h e  redundancy concept  
b u i l t  i n t o  t h e  message procedures and fo rged t h e  f i r s t  two l i n k s  o f  an a l l -  
t o o - f a m i l i a r  c h a i n  of events  t h a t  cou ld  c u l m i n a t e  i n  an a v i a t i o n  d i s a s t e r .  
The p i l o t  concern f o r  t h e  dua l  f a i l u r e  i n  comnunicat ions condensed i n t o  a 
s i n g l e ,  r e p e t i t i v e  query :  "SO, we made an e r r o r .  BUT we made a readback. 
WHY d i d n ' t  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  c a t c h  o u r  e r r o r  i n  t h e  readback?" 
The v a r i o u s  t ypes  o f  r e p o r t e d  f a i l u r e s  i n  t h e  ATC/cockpit communications 
exchanges a r e  shown i n  Table 3. However o u r  examinat ion  o f  t h e  i n c i d e n t  s e t  
i d e n t i f i e d  seve ra l  o p e r a t i o n a l  p a t t e r n s ,  p r a c t i c e s ,  and preconcept ions  i n  
c o m u n i c a t i o n s  whose s i g n i f i c a n c e  extends beyond t h e  counts  t a b u l a t e d  i n  t h e  
t a b l e .  
The most c o n s i s t e n t  b e h a v i o r a l  p a t t e r n  observed i n  t h e  airmen submis- 
s i o n s  was an o v e r r i d i n g  t r u s t f u l  dependence upon t h e  c o n t r o l l e r s '  l i s t e n i n g  
f u n c t i o n  i n  t h e  to / f ro rn  exchanges. Ha l f -hea rd ,  d o u b t f u l ,  sometimes guessed 
a t  numbers f o r  headings, a l t i t u d e s ,  t a x i  h o l d  p o i n t s ,  o r  V i c t o r  a i rway  r o u t -  
i n g s  -- IF t h e i r  readbacks passed uncha l lenyed --  were accepted by t h e  a i rmen 
as v a l i d a t e d ,  double-checked i n s t r u c t i o n s  as t o  where t o  f l y  t h e i r  a i r p l a n e s .  
Accept ing  heard  c lea rances  f o r  descents  t o  l o w  a l t i t u d e s  w h i l e  w e l l  o u t s i d e  
normal d i s t a n c e - t o - d e s t i n a t i o n  range, c l i m b s  above usual  a l t i t u d e s ,  t u r n s  180 
degrees away f rom d e s i r e d  t r a c k ,  wrong d i r e c t i o n  f l i g h t  l e v e l s ,  descents  i n  
c louds  down th rough  t i e r s  of a i r c r a f t  i n  a h o l d i n g  s tack ,  I M C  descents  be low 
known inountainous t e r r a i n  - -  t h e  airmen subord ina ted  commonsense judgement 
and o p e r a t i o n a l  p r a c t i c a l i t y  t o  an assumption f rom a c o n t r o l l e r ' s  s i l e n t  
" c o n f i  r m a t i  on" o f  t h e i r  readbacks 
Appear ing a lmost  as f r e q u e n t  y i n  r e p o r t  n a r r a t i v e s  was an i m p l i c i t  a i r -  
man assumption t h a t  c o n t r o l  1 e r s  were i n v o l v e d  s o l e l y  i n  m o n i t o r i n g  progress  
o f  t h c i  r i n d i v i d u a l  a i r c r a f t  . P i  1 o t s  expressed puzz l  ement, sometimes 
i n c ~ d u l i t y ,  a t  "be ing  p e r m i t t e d "  t o  l e v e l  o f f  a t  a l t i t u d e s  thousands o f  f e e t  
f rom t h e i r  ass igned a l t i t u d e s  o r  t o  f l y  5, 10, o r  i n  one r e p o r t  25, m i l e s  i n  
wrong d i r e c t i o n s  o r  r o u t i n g s .  
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However, no c l e a r ,  s i n g l e  answer t o  t h e  a i r m e n ' s  query  (''WHY d i d n ' t  t h e  
c o n t r o l l e r  c a t c h  o u r  e r r o r  i n  t h e  readback?")  emerged f ro in  a n a l y s i s  o f  t h e  
c o n t r o l l e r  r e p o r t s  o f  communications f a i l u r e s .  The c o n t r o l l e r s  tended t o  
r e s t r i c t  t h e i r  e r r o r  r e p o r t s  o n l y  t o  those  d e v i a t i o n s  t h a t  developed i n t o  
t r a f f i c  c o n f l i c t s ;  t h e  r e p o r t  c o n t e n t s  d e a l t  w i t h  c o l l i s i o n  avoidance s teps  
and f r e q u e n t l y  de-emphasized t h e  l i s t e n i n g  r o l e  i n t o  "I missed...", "I f a i l e d  
t o  hear...", and s i m i l a r  b r e v i t i e s .  
The d i s c u s s i o n  o f  t h e  i n d u s t r y  s tandard  readback / l  i s t e n / c o n f i r m / c o n f i  r m  
message procedure  i n  t h e  A I M  may i n v o k e  d i s t u r b i n g  u n c e r t a i n t i e s  i n  a i rmen 
c o n d i t i o n e d  t o  r e l y  on c o n t r o l l e r  m o n i t o r i n g .  "On some occas ions" ,  adv i ses  
AIM, ''due t o  t h e  press o f  t i m e  f o r  i ssuance o f  t i m e  c r i t i c a l  i n s t r u c t i o n s  t o  
o t h e r  a i r c r a f t ,  c o n t r o l l e r s  may be i n  a p o s i t i o n  t o  observe y o u r  response 
v i s u a l l y  o r  on rada r . "  Sa id  more d i r e c t l y ,  a c o n t r o l l e r ' s  c o n f i r m a t i o n  o f  a 
readback, a t  t i m e s ,  may be s h i f t e d  f rom l i s t e n i n g  t o  a p i l o t ' s  words t o  
o b s e r v i n g  a p i l o t ' s  a c t i o n s .  Fur thermore,  such "occas ions"  a r e  w i t h o u t  p i l o t  
know1 edge. 
It may w e l l  be  t h a t  t h e  l a t i t u d e  i m p l i e d  i n  t h e  A I M ' S  language i s  
i n t e n d e d  t o  accommodate t h e  on-going i n d u s t r y - r e c o g n i z e d  t r a f f i c  surges t h a t  
occu r  i n  t h e  a i r w a y  r o u t e s  and approach c o n t r o l  a i r s p a c e  a t  o u r  ma jo r  U.S. 
t e r m i n a l s .  l o o p h o l e  p r o v i s i o n  f o r  d e p a r t i n g  f r o m  t h e  u n i f o r m  and long -  
e s t a b l  i shed ve rba l  procedure appears nar row and c o n d i t i  on-1 i m i t e d .  Yet, i f  
n o t h i n g  e l s e ,  t h e  p o t e n t i a l  f o r  a p i l o t ' s  se l f - inducement  i n t o  "nonadherence 
t o  ATC c l e a r a n c e / i n s t r u c t i o n s "  th rough  t h e  l o s s  o f  hearback redundancy shou ld  
s t r e s s  t o  a l l  a i rmen t h e  impor tance o f  f i r s t  " g e t t i n g  t h e  numbers s t r a i g h t "  
d u r i n g  a c o n t r o l l e r ' s  i n i t i a l  t r a n s m i s s i o n s  and, second, c l a r i f y i n g  any con- 
f u s i o n  o r  doubt  b y  s u i t a b l y  que ry ing  t h e  i n f o r m a t i o n .  
The 
The e r r o r  c i t a t i o n s  compi led  i n  t h i s  s t u d y  a r e  r e l a t i v e l y  few when 
p laced  i n  c o n t e x t  w i t h  t h e  o v e r a l l  n a t i o n a l  a i r s p a c e  communications l oad .  
The occur rence o f  417 v o l u n t a r i l y - r e p o r t e d  i n c i d e n t s  d u r i n g  a 29-month 
t imef rame r e p r e s e n t s  b u t  a r i p p l e  i n  t h e  main s t ream o f  hundreds o f  thousands 
o f  t o / f r o m / t o  c o n t a c t s  b e i n g  made d a i l y  i n  t h e  a v i a t i o n  system. Even so, t h e  
e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h e  417 c i t a t i o n s  i s  i n c o n t r o v e r t i b l e  ev idence t h a t  t h e  hearback 
problem e x i s t s  and i s  capable o f  p roduc ing  o p e r a t i o n a l  anomal ies w i t h  
a c c i d e n t  r i s k s  t h a t  a r e  f a r  f rom n e g l i g i b l e .  A lso,  t h e  417 c i t a t i o n s  
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c o n s t i t u t e  o n l y  t h e  l ower  bound o f  t h e  a c t u a l  number o f  occurrences;  w i t h  a 
v o l u n t a r y  r e p o r t i n g  system, which i s  what ASRS i s ,  we can be v i r t u a l l y  c e r -  
t a i n  t h a t  t h e r e  a r e  more a c t u a l  t han  r e p o r t e d  occurrences o f  any g i v e n  k i n d .  
The r e p e t i t i v e  airman query :  "So we made a mis take .  But  we made a 
Why d i d n ' t  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  c a t c h  t h e  e r r o r  i n  o u r  readback?" i s  b u t  readback. 
p a r t l y  answered i n  t h e  f i n d i n g s  o f  t h i s  s tudy .  
The c o n t r o l l e r  may have been "obse rv ing "  t h e  readback on r a d a r .  
O r ,  he may have c o m i t t e d  a human e r r o r  as t h e  airman a l r e a d y  had. 
ADDENDA 
Th is  s t u d y  was conducted d u r i n g  t h e  summer o f  1984; d u r i n g  t h e  e a r l y  
f a l l  o f  t h a t  y e a r  cop ies  o f  t h e  f i r s t  d r a f t  r e p o r t  were d i s t r i b u t e d  f o r  peer  
r e v i e w  b y  those  elements o f  t h e  a v i a t i o n  i n d u s t r y  and r e l a t e d  f e d e r a l  govern- 
ment agencies t h a t  t h e  a u t h o r  and NASA o f f i c i a l s  though t  were knowledgeable 
and would be i n t e r e s t e d  i n  cornnenting c o n s t r u c t i v e l y  on t h e  work. Many d i d .  
T h e i r  comments were most h e l p f u l  i n  t h e  p r e p a r a t i o n  o f  t h e  f i n a l ,  p u b l i s h e d  
s tudy  r e p o r t .  
It i s  a l s o  no tewor thy  and o f  i n t e r e s t  t o  readers  o f  t h i s  r e p o r t  t h a t  
e a r l y  i n  1985, t h e  FAA r e l e a s e d  a change t o  t h e  ATC handbook ( e f f e c t i v e  
02/14/85) add ing  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  language i n  Chapter  2, Sec t i on  4. 
NEW -
2-72. ENSURING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT 
a. When i s s u i n g  i n f o r m a t i o n ,  c learances ,  
o r  i n s t r u c t i o n s ,  ensure acknowledge- 
ment by t h e  p i l o t .  
b. I f  a l t i t u d e  heading.  o r  o t h e r  i tems 
a r e  read  back by  t h e  p i l o t ,  ensure 
t h e  readback i s  c o r r e c t .  I f  
i n c o r r e c t ,  d i s t o r t e d ,  o r  incomple te ,  
make c o r r e c t i o n  as a p p r o p r i a t e .  
Thus, t h e  s tatement  on page 5 o f  t h e  s tudy  r e p o r t  r e g a r d i n g  t h e  absence o f  
w r i t t e n  r e g u l a t i o n s  on hearbacks i s  n o t  a p p l i c a b l e  t o  c u r r e n t  a v i a t i o n  opera- 
t i o n s  a l t h o u g h  e n t i r e l y  v a l i d  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h e  r e p o r t s  used i n  c o n d u c t i n g  
t h e  s tudy.  It i s  t o o  e a r l y  t o  t e l l  i f  t h i s  handbook m o d i f i c a t i o n  has reduced 
t h e  i n c i d e n c e  o f  hearback problems i n  a v i a t i o n .  ASRS c o n t i n u e s  t o  r e c e i v e  
them a t  a p p r o x i m a t e l y  t h e  same average r a t e  ( c i r c a  June, 1985) as i n  t h e  
p e r i o d  preced ing  t h e  conduct o f  t h i s  s tudy .  
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